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STRATEGIES IN ZONING AND COMMUNITY LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS FOR RETARDED CITIZENS:
PARENS PATRIAE MEETS POLICE POWER
PENELOPE A. BOYDt
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Normalization for the Mentally Retarded and
the Community Living Arrangement
T HAS BEEN ESTIMATED that at any given time two million
Americans function at a level designated "retarded."1 Recently, it
has been recognized that these retarded persons are individuals who
can learn and grow, like the rest of the human population, and are
not victims of a static condition.' This "discovery" of the ability of
retarded persons to develop has led mental retardation professionals
and members of the legal community to question the social utility of
the large institution in the promotion of that development.3
f B.A., Pennsylvania State University, 1976; J.D., Villanova University School of Law,
1979. Member, Pennsylvania Bar. The author would like to express her gratitude to Professor
John Hyson of the Villanova University School of Law for his sponsorship of the original version
of this article; and to Tracey Rogers, an undergraduate at the University of Pennsylvania, for
her assistance in the revisions.
1. P. FREIDMAN, THE RIGHTS OF MENTALLY RETARDED PERSONS 15 (1976). "Retardation
is wholly distinct from mental illness .... Mental retardation is primarily an educational prob-
lem and not a disease which can be cured through drugs or treatment." Halderman v. Penn-
hurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1298 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd indpart, rev'd and
remanded in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), petition for cert. fided, 48 U.S.L.W.
3614 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 79-1404). Mentally retarded people are handicapped in that they
are "unable to function at the same educational and behavioral levels as the rest of society." Id.
at 1313. See Mason & Menaloscino, The Right to Treatment for the Mentally Retarded: An
Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 124, 124 n.1 (1977).
Generally, retardation is defined as a disability which arises during the developmental years
and is classified according to intelligence quotient (I.Q.) levels spanning four degrees-mild,
moderate, severe, and profound. Thus, 89% of the retarded population are designated mildly
retarded (I.Q. 52-67); 6% moderately retarded (I.Q. 36-51); and the remaining 5% either se-
verely (I.Q. 20-35) or profoundly (I.Q. under 20) retarded. Id.; 446 F. Supp. at 1298-99.
Paul Friedman, Director of the Mental Health Law Project, explains that
[al person is mentally retarded when "we" say he is. Mental retardation is not a tact,
but a label or classification applied to a very diverse group of people-often for purposes
of segregating or restricting them, although sometimes for purposes of providing services
not available to all in the community.
P. FRIEDMAN, supra, at 14.
2. See generally Mason & Menaloscino, supra note 1. Previous misperceptions were man-
ifest in characterizations of retarded persons as eternal children, sexual deviants, or blessed
individuals. Wolfensburger, The Origin and Nature of Our Institutional Models, in CHANGING
PATTERNS IN RESIDENTIAL SERVICES TO MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS 59 (R. Kugel & W.
Wolfensburger eds. 1976).
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The development of a retarded individual is fostered by a process
called "habilitation." 4  Many mental retardation professionals now
believe that habilitation is maximized by normalization of the person's
surroundings, i.e., by treating him or her as much like a nonhandi-
capped person as possible. 5  Normalization, of necessity, requires the
rejection of the impersonal and isolated large institution in favor of
smaller, community-based living arrangements. 6 Essentially, the
theory is that a person is best taught how to live in the community by
living there, rather than attempting to learn to live in the community
by living in an institution.
When retarded individuals are habilitated in the community,
they are generally housed in a community living arrangement (CLA
or group home). A community living arrangement is comprised of a
small number of persons living in a house or apartment under the
supervision of one or more houseparents. 7 The clients of the CLA
live together as a unit, often working in either sheltered workshops or
at jobs in the community during the day.8  Every attempt is made to
appear as much like an average family as possible. 9 In a CLA, the
4. " 'Habilitation' is the term of art used to refer to that education, training, and care
required by retarded individuals to reach their maximum development." Halderman v. Penn-
hurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1298 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd and
remanded in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W.
3614 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 79-1404).
5. See, e.g., Glenn, The Least Restrictive Alternative in Residential Care and the Principle
of Normalization, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 499 (1976); Nirje, The
Normalization Principle and Its Human Management Implications, in CHANGING PATTERNS IN
RESIDENTIAL SERVICES TO MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZENS 179 (R. Kugel & W. Wolfensburger
eds. 1976).
6. Chandler & Ross. Zoning Restrictions and the Right to Live in the Community, in THE
MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 305, 308 (1976). One expert in this field, Gun-
nar Dybwad, has observed that
the normalization principle [can be refined] into the essential components of integration,
dispersal, specialization and continuity. Integration is the absorption of the retarded into
the community; dispersal is the uniform distribution of residential facilities throughout the
community; specialization is the limitation on the types of residents served in a certain
facility and the services offered to the resident; and continuity enables the handicapped
individual to receive a broad range of specialized services and available care.
Id. But see Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc),
petition for cert. fded, 48 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 79-1404) (stating that some
individuals may be harmed by movement from the institution).
7. Legal Issues in Mental Health Care: Proposals for Change, Zoning for Community Resi-
dences, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 315, 316 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Zoning for Corn-
munity Residences]. Because anonymity is desired, CLA's are generally set up in rented
facilities or previously constructed buildings. Id, at 317. See Lippincott, A Sanctuary for People,
31 STAN. L. REV. 767, 769 (1979).
8. Telephone interview with Vivian Lotz, former Director of the Southwest Community
Action Program, Philadelphia, Pa. (Mar. 23, 1979); telephone interview with Marilyn Mennis,
Alliance of Specialized Mental Health and Mental Retardation Agencies, Philadelphia, Pa. (Feb.
20, 1979).
9. Telephone interview with Marilyn Mennis, supra note 8.
2
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habilitative process is constantly active. Clients learn much by simply
living in the community. Special skills necessary for an independent
life-style are taught on a daily basis and supplement programs outside
the CLA. 10 Maximizing individual independence is the goal.
Institutions, on the other hand, have only achieved the isolation
and confinement of individuals whom society has labeled deviant."
Personnel of state institutions maintain that improvements in the
clients' conditions are unattainable because of the minimal funding
voted by state legislatures.' 2 The fact remains, however, that life in
an institution, even an adequately funded one, destroys rather than
develops personal and social functioning, and harms rather than helps
the retarded individual.
13
The effects of institutionalization appear even more bleak when
contrasted with the favorable results achieved, both in terms of cost
and of habilitation, by providing normalization through CLA's. Partial
or total self-sufficiency has been achieved in these community settings
when it was never expected in institutions. 14 The community pro-
vides continual "free" learning experiences and stimulation unavail-
able to retarded persons living in the sterile environment of a large,
isolated institution. From an economic standpoint, group homes are
also more profitable. In a group home, the amount of benefit be-
stowed per dollar expended is greater than the figure for institu-
tions, 15 while a substantial overall cost reduction per client has re-
sulted. 16 Furthermore, the resulting habilitation allows the full or
partial employment of the individual.
Many mental retardation professionals, recognizing the benefits
of CLA's and the potential destructiveness of institutions, have
changed their views on the proper method of caring for the mentally
10. Telephone interview with Marilyn Mennis, supra note 8.
11. See generally E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961); D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE
ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971).
12. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en bane), petition for cert.
filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 79-1404); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp.
781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), remedy ordered, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd
and remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
13. Ferleger & Boyd, Anti-Institutionalization: The Promise of the Pennhurst Case, 31
STAN. L. REV. 717, 721-22 (1979).
14. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1311 (E.D. Pa.
1977), aff'd in part, revd and remanded in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), petition
for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 79-1404).
15. Id. at 1312.
16. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Sup. 1295, 1312 (E.D. Pa.
1977), aff'd in part, revd and remanded in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en bane), petition
fir cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 79-1404). See also 611 F.2d at 116 n.39.
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retarded. 17  This change in attitude by mental retardation profession-
als has led to a change in the disposition of the legal system toward
the retarded."' The development of the habilitation-through-
normalization theory (developmental model), and the revelation of the
horrendous conditions in large institutions, has resulted in legislation
and litigation to prevent future damage to retarded persons and to
promote their present development. 19 Concentrating on the envi-
ronment in the state facilities, the first lawsuits and statutes estab-
lished the right to habilitation for retarded residents and included in
that right the right of the individual to receive habilitative services in
the least restrictive alternative form of care. 20  A later group of law-
suits set forth the theory that the institution can never be the least
restrictive alternative for any retarded person, regardless of the de-
17. See, e.g., Glenn, supra note 6; Nirje, supra note 5.
18. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa.
1977), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en bane), petition
for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 79-1404); Mason & Menaloscino,
supra note 1.
19. See, e.g., Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50,
§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969); Halderman v. Fennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295
(E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part, revd and remanded in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc),
petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 79-1404). For a discussion
of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, see notes 47-51 and accompany-
ing text infra.
20. Welsh v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 502 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated and
remanded in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390
(M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, revd and remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wisc. 1972)
(three-judge court), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974). In requiring the least restric-
tive alternative for the mentally ill, the district court in Lessard explained what it perceived to
be the constitutional basis for this principle:
Even if the standards for an adjudication of mental illness and potential dangerous-
ness are satisfied, a court should order full-time involuntary hospitalization only as a last
resort. A basic concept in American justice is the principle that "even though the gov-
ernmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more nar-
rowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." Perhaps the most basic and funda-
mental right is the right to be free from unwanted restraint. It seems clear, then, that
persons suffering from the condition of being mentally ill, but who are not alleged to have
committed any crime, cannot be totally deprived of their liberty if there are less drastic
means for achieving the same basic goal.
349 F. Supp. at 1095-96 (citations omitted), quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960). The Lessard court continued by noting that
[i]n Lake v. Cameron, the [United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit] ruled that the state should "bear the burden of exploration of possible alterna-
tives" to commitment. We believe that the person recommending full-time involuntary
hospitalization must bear the burden of proving (1) what alternatives are available; (2)
what alternatives were investigated; and (3) why the investigated alternatives were not
deemed suitable. These alternatives include voluntary or court-ordered out-patient treat-
ment, day treatment in a hospital, night treatment in a hospital, placement in the custody
of a friend or relative, placement in a nursing home, referral to a community mental
health clinic, and home health aide services.
349 F. Supp. at 1095-96, quoting Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
[VOL. 25: p. 273
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gree of their handicap. 2' These suits have resulted in orders requir-
ing community services unless movement from the institution would
harm the individual.2
2
B. Zoning and the Community Living Arrangement
Carefully conceived social reform may, however, be thwarted by
local opposition despite state or federal support.2 3  The
deinstitutionalization/anti-institutionalization 24 movement has brought
into sharp focus the inescapable conclusion that the popular percep-
tion of the retarded has not kept pace with the growth in understand-
ing among mental retardation professionals. Communities resist the
influx of group homes, while individuals profess acceptance (or at
least, tolerance) of the theory behind them.2 5 Since a community is
no more than a coming together of individuals, how is it that this
community resistance emerges from professed individual tolerance? It
is submitted that zoning laws are used by less than intellectually hon-
est individuals who shield their opposition to the establishment of
21. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa.
1977), aff'd in part, revd and remanded in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), petition
for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 79-1404); Garrity v. Thomson, 81
F.R.D. 633 (D.N.H. 1979); Washington Assoc. for Retarded Citizens v. Thomas, No. C-78-163
(E.D. Wash., filed June 16, 1978). The evolutionary process of the theory behind these cases is
more fully explored in Ferleger & Boyd, supra note 13. See also Boyd, The Developmental
Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act: A Mechanism for the Deinstitutionalization and
Enforcement of the Rights of the Mentally Retarded? (1978) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author).
In the Pennhurst case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently
affirmed the district court's finding of a right to habilitation in the least restrictive alternative,
but reversed the lower court's blanket order that all retarded individuals then institutionalized
be moved to CLA's and that the Pennhurst institution be closed. Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp., 611 F.2d at 114-15. The Third Circuit rejected the district court's finding that an
institution could never be the least restrictive alternative. Id. at 114. Despite this suggestion by
the Third Circuit that for some patients the institution may be the least restrictive alternative,
the court emphasized that deinstitutionalization is the preferred course and that, on remand,
the master appointed by the district court should engage in a presumption in favor of placing
patients in CIA's. Id. at 115.
22. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48
U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 79-1404); note 21 supra. Cf. Towne Court Nursing
Home v. Beal, - F.2d - (3d Cir. 1979), appeal pending, 48 U.S.L.W. - (U.S. - 1980) (No.
23. Kressel, The Community Residence Movement: Land Use Conflicts and the Planning
Imperatives, 5 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 137, 137-38 (1975).
24. The term anti-institutionalization was coined by David Ferleger, Esq., as a means of
expressing the belief that no retarded person should be subjected to an institution. See Ferleger
& Boyd, supra note 13, at 723-24.
25. Sigelman, Spanhel & Lorenzen, Community Reactions to Deinstitutionalization: Crime,
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group homes in their own neighborhood by citing the justification of
land use planning.2 6  Two kinds of zoning barriers can be raised: 1)
an ordinance which excludes group homes from all residential zones,
usually by narrowly defining the family; 27 and 2) an ordinance which
grants discretion to the planning body to authorize or to prohibit
group homes. 28 The Pennsylvania zoning scheme makes possible
both tactics.
29
Since the state has delegated its power to zone to local govern-
ment bodies 30 who are more likely to respond to local pressures, and
since the power to zone embraces the power to exclude, 31 concerted
community resistance may result in either the total exclusion of the
retarded from the community, or in their partial exclusion by relegat-
ing CLA's to areas not zoned for single-family residences. Total exclu-
sion stifles habilitation by forcing residents to remain in institutions,
while partial exclusion creates ghettos of mentally disabled individuals
in those communities or those portions of a community which have
accepted their responsibilities to retarded citizens.
32
The drawbacks of community living arrangements which do exist
result not from retarded persons' entry into the community, but from
the failure of local and state bodies to meet their obligations to these
citizens. States fail to provide adequate services to complement com-
munity placement, "dumping" the former institutional residents into
the community. 33 Communities exclude them from the sacrosanct
single-family residential districts, causing their sequestration in high-
density, low-income neighborhoods. 34 Exclusion from certain zones
results in the development of areas with unnaturally large numbers of
group homes, each such area a sprawling institution within the com-
26. See notes 106-21 and accompanying text infra.
27. See The Developmental Disabilities Model Legislation Series: Zoning for Community
Homes Serving Developmentally Disabled Persons, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 795, 796
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Developmental Disabilities].
28. Friedman, Analysis of the Principal Issues and Strategies in Zoning Exclusion Cases, in
2 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 1093, 1095 (1973).
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10603 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
30. Id. § 10601 (Purdon 1972).
31. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Although the Court in
Village of Euclid was speaking of the exclusion of uses, rather than of people, as a practical
matter, many retarded people can be excluded from an area by the exclusion of the group home
use.
32. See Zoning for Community Residences, supra note 7, at 316.
33. See Kressel, supra note 23, at 139.
34. See id.; Developmental Disabilities, supra note 27, at 796; Zoning for Community Resi-
dences, supra note 7, at 319.
[VOL. 25: p. 273
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munity. 35  These "disability ghettos" are by definition non-
normalizing and antihabilitative.
36
From the standpoint of mental retardation experts, entry into
single-family residential zones is not simply preferable, but in fact, it
is necessary for minimally adequate habilitation to take place.
3 7
Proponents of CLA's would support the dispersal requirements rec-
ommended by some authorities, but these cannot be met unless en-
tire areas are open to group homes.3 8 It would seem that minimally
adequate habilitation cannot be provided without the entry of the re-
tarded into the community and this requires community acceptance
of their responsibility.
Thus, this article examines the use of zoning ordinances by
communities to exclude group homes from residential areas and the
arguments proponents can advance in support of the establishment of
CLA's. Specifically, this examination will be made in the context of
Pennsylvania law.
39
II. ZONING AND MENTAL RETARDATION SERVICES IN
PENNSYLVANIA: A STUDY IN LOCAL AUTONOMY
A. The Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966:
An Exercise of the Parens Patriae Power
"Parens patriae" literally means "parent of the country" 40 and
derives from the obligation of the English monarchy to exercise re-
35. See Zoning for Community Residences, supra note 7, at 319.
36. Id.; Developmental Disabilities, supra note 27, at 796.
One study summarized the situation as follows:
These types of restrictions frequently result in the creation of ghettos of community
homes, particularly in larger center cities. Such a concentration occurs because the only
districts open to community homes are transitional and politically weak residential
neighborhoods or business or institutional zones. This ghettoizing leads to the creation of
a new form of institutionalization-large numbers of community homes in certain areas of
a city so that the homes become the dominant feature of a residential neighborhood.
These concentrations change the character of the neighborhoods and undercut the very
purposes behind "normalization.'" Further, they provoke justified, negative reactions on
the part of neighborhoods where the community homes are impacted, and strengthen the
resolve of other communities to avoid admitting community homes for fear that such
concentrations will occur in their communities.
Id.
37. See Lippincott, supra note 7, at 769.
38. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
39. See Mental Health and Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704
(Purdon 1969); Municipalities Planning Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11202 (Purdon
1972 & Supp. 1979).
Challenges to zoning laws based on both the state and federal constitutions are possible,
but are generally not within the scope of this article. See MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT,
COMBA'TTING EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: THE RIGHT OF THE HANDICAPPED PEOPLE TO LIVE IN
THE COMMUNITY 1-4 (1979).
40. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
1979-1980]
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sponsibility for dependent and vulnerable members of society, such
as the insane, the retarded, and dependent children. 41 As one study
has indicated: "In acting as parens patriae, the King or his represen-
tative was required to promote the interests and welfare of his wards
and was not empowered to sacrifice the ward's welfare to the welfare
of others." 42  After the American revolution, this responsibility set-
tled in the state legislatures.
43
Parens patriae has been called alternatively a power, a duty, and
a function of state government. 44 It is perhaps best understood as
the role of a state as sovereign and guardian of persons under a legal
disability. 45 When the state acts as parens patriae it must act in the
best interest of the individual who is subject to the state action.
46
In Pennsylvania, the state's view of its parens patriae duty has
led to the enactment of a statute providing habilitative services for
the retarded. 47 Pennsylvania's Mental Health and Mental Retarda-
tion Act of 1966 (Act)48 was adopted to further national and state
objectives of community mental health care. 49 Although the de-
velopmental model had not been fully adopted by mental retardation
professionals at the time the Act was passed, 50 the basic precepts of
the community mental health movement which the Act embodies
support the model's emphasis on community services for the re-
tarded. 51
41. Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190,
1207-08 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law]. As the Harvard study indicates,
"[u]nder English law at the time of the American colonies, the King had the authority to act as
the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics." Id. at 1207, quoting Hawaii v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972), quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 47. The
study also pointed out that "[t]he sovereign, as father of the country, was responsible for the
care and custody of "all persons who had lost their intellects and became . . . incompetent to
take care of themselves." Developments in the Law, supra, at 1207-08, quoting In re Barker, 2
Johns. Ch. 232, 236 (N.Y. 1816) (citations omitted).
42. Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 1208.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 1207-20.
45. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
46. See Developments in the Law, supra note 41, at 1220-21.
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969).
48. Id.
49. See Appeal of Niccoli, 472 Pa. 389, 398, 372 A.2d 749, 754 (1977) (the Act manifests "a
clear legislative intent not merely to sanction but to encourage necessary psychiatric care and
treatment on a voluntary basis to the extent feasible"). This legislative activity was also motivated
by the promise of federal funding available through a 1963 federal grant-in-aid program to sup-
port mental health planning. See Comment, Hospitalization of the Mentally Disabled in
Pennsylvania: The Mental Health-Mental Retardation Act of 1966, 71 DICK. L. REv. 300, 302
n. 16 (1967).
50. See Mason & Menaloscino, supra note 1, at 136-38.
51. Pennsylvania supports the movement of the retarded into the community, and through
legislative appropriations for community programs, the state is trying to reduce the population
of persons inside institutions. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp.
1295, 1311-12 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.
1979) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 79-1404).
VOL. 25: p. 273
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The Act apportions the responsibility for the delivery of services
to the retarded between the Commonwealth and the counties. 52 Un-
fortunately, by placing responsibility for the provision of some of the
services on the counties, the Act permits the fulfillment of the parens
patriae duties to be jeopardized by parochial and sometimes irrele-
vant considerations, much the same as occurs in the area of land
planning where the state's delegation of the zoning power gives local
governments full sway. 53  The initial objective of the Act-the edu-
cation and protection of a vulnerable group-has been made subject
to the inevitable pressures of local politics. A brief overview of the
allocation of responsibilities and the method for selecting those who
hold these responsibilities highlights this fact.
As previously noted,5" the Act identifies two governmental units
as conduits for the provision of services to the retarded: the Com-
monwealth, which acts through the Department of Public Welfare,
and the counties. The Act contemplates the sharing of fiscal and man-
agerial responsibility. 55 Each county is required to establish a Men-
tal Health and Mental Retardation Board, 56 a body charged with the
duty of advising the local authorities 57 on the needs of local citizens
and helping to develop annual plans for the delivery of services and
programs. 58 With the exception of the boards in cities of the first
class, 59 each county Mental Health and Mental Retardation Board
selects and recommends a candidate to the local authorities for the
position of County Administrator for Mental Health and Mental Re-
Unfortunately, a number of factors preclude the utilization of these funds by the executive bureau-
cracy; principal among them is the failure to pinpoint responsibility for the creation and im-
plementation of the necessary community services. 446 F. Supp. at 1311-12.
52. See Hoolick v. Retreat State Hosp., 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 218, 221-22, 354 A.2d 609, 611
(1976), aff'd, 476 Pa. 317, 382 A.2d 739 (1978). The Hoolick court explained that
[tihe Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 envisions a comprehensive
cooperative State-county (or multi-county) program for the care, treatment and rehabilita-
tion of persons who are mentally disabled or mentally retarded through a system of out-
patient facilities and in-patient facilities for those who need institutionalized care.
The State, through the Department of Welfare, is responsible for the overall supervi-
sion and control of the program to assure the availability of and equitable provision for
adequate mental health and mental retardation facilities, and the counties, separately or
in concert, are assigned responsibilities as to particular programs.
Id.
53. See note 31 and accompanying text supra; notes 89-95 and accompanying text infra.
54. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
55. See Hoolick v. Retreat State Hosp., 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 218, 221-22, 354 A.2d 609, 611
(1976), aff'd, 476 Pa. 317, 382 A.2d 739 (1978); note 52 supra.
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4302 (Purdon 1969).
57. Id. § 4303. The Act defines the local authorities as the county commisioners of a county,
or the city councils and the mayors of the first class cities. Id. § 4102.
58. Id. § 4303.
59. Philadelphia, a city of the first class, employs the merit system to select its admini-
strator. Id. § 4303.
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tardation. 60 This administrator is responsible for certain administra-
tive, reporting, and liaison functions regarding the delivery of -serv-
ices to the mentally disabled.
6'
The actual provision of the services falls in the first instance on
the counties.6 2 The local county authorities are under a duty to en-
sure that these community-based services are available to their citi-
zens. 63 Conceptually, the system anticipates that the retarded indi-
viduals desiring services will be evaluated and placed in appropriate
community programs by the county authorities. Institutionalization is
to be used only when deemed absolutely necessary. 64 Supervision,
reevaluation, and relocation are continuing client services which the
local authorities are expected to perform in a manner consistent with
the needs of the individual. 65 As a practical matter, however, both
political and fiscal pressures prevent the realization of this ideal.
The brunt of the fiscal responsibility for these programs falls on
the state which pays 90% of the costs of county programs. 66 The
state also carries a residual responsibility to make available all man-
dated programs. 67 The Department of Public Welfare is statutorily
obligated to assure the availability of services to all mentally retarded
individuals who need them, 68 and to aid the counties with their local
programs. 69  If a county is financially unable to provide these serv-
ices it may seek a waiver from the Department of its statutory obli-
gation, in which case the Department will assume 100% of the fiscal
responsibility. 70  In addition to its supplementary responsibilities for
the county programs, the Department operates all of the state
facilities. 71 It is fiscally responsible for the diagnosis, evaluation, and
care provided in state-operated facilities, for new programs estab-
60. id.
61. Id. § 4305.
62. Id. § 4301.
63. Id. The required services include the following: short-term in-patient care at facilities
other than those provided by the state; out-patient services; partial hospitalization; emergency
services; consultation and educational services to professional personnel and community agen-
cies; aftercare services; specialized rehabilitative and training services, including sheltered work-
shops; interim care of the mentally retarded who have been accepted into state facilities; and a
unified procedure for intake and placement. Id. § 4301(d).
64. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1311-13 (E.D.
Pa. 1977), aff'd in part, revd and remanded in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc),
petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Mar.25, 1980)(No.79-1404).
65. 446 F. Supp. at 1313.
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4509 (Purdon 1969).
67. See, e.g., In re Joyce Z., 123 Pitt. L.J. 181, 188-89 (C.P. Pa. 1975).
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4201 (Purdon 1969).
69. Id. § 4509.
70. See id. § 4508; Commonwealth v. Benjamin J., No. 096177 (C.P. Chester Pa., Nov. 28,
1978), reprinted in PENNSYLVANIA BAR INSTITUTE, ASSERTING THE RIGHTS OF THE MEN-
TALLY AND PHYSICALLY DISABLED 84-85 (1979).
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4202 (Purdon 1969).
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lished by the state, and for certain durations of in-patient care and
interim care for the tnentally retarded. 72 So, although the responsi-
bility for initiating group homes rests with the counties, 73 it appears
that both the state and the counties share the responsibility for the
homes and for their necessary ancillary services. Unfortunately, fiscal
disincentives have caused a different result.
74
Since, absent a waiver, 75 the counties must absorb 10% of the
cost of services in the community, they operate under a disincentive
to provide adequate local services for the retarded. 76  Because the
initial assessment of the retarded individual is provided by the
county, he or she is generally placed in a state institution where the
state bears the entire cost. 7 7  Once relegated to state institutions,
many individuals experience regression, thereby inhibiting their pos-
sibilities for successful community placement later. 78 Thus, the pres-
ent structure of the Act permits the counties to shuffle their respon-
sibilities off onto the state with no discernible benefit for retarded
persons whose interests are purportedly at the center of the system.
The existence of this grey area of state-county responsibility has
precluded the effective development of programs which are less re-
strictive alternatives. In addition to the fiscal considerations, the an-
ticipated political repercussions of moving the retarded into com-
munities creates a disincentive for municipal initiative. 79 Thus, even
if the economic problems facing local mental health and retardation
authorities are remedied, this will not ensure the establishment of
community living arrangements, because, as will be demonstrated,
community opposition to these living arrangements may surface
through the zoning process and perhaps preclude the state's habilita-
tive efforts.
72. Id. § 4507.
73. Id. § 4301. See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4508 (Purdon 1969) (allowing counties to apply to Department
of Welfare to be relieved of their responsibilities).
75. See id.; text accompanying note 70 supra.
76. Although the county is entitled to recover costs from persons receiving services or from
those under a legal duty to support such individuals, PA. STAT.ANN. tit. 50, § 4505 (Purdon
1969), generally, retarded persons receiving care from the state or counties come from families
unable to bear the cost. See generally id.§ 4502 (Purdon Supp. 1979). These individuals often
receive only public benefits such as a social security disability which cannot be collected
through legal process by the county or the Commonwealth in payment of the debts. See Phil-
pott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1973).
77. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Snpp. 1295, 1312-13 (E.D.
Pa. 1977), aff'd in part, revd and remanded in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc),
petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 79-1404). PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 50, § 4202 (Purdon 1969); text accompanying note 71 supra.
78. Ferleger & Boyd, supra note 13, at 721-22.
79. See also note 76 and accompanying text supra.
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B. The Municipalities Planning Code:
An Exercise of the Police Poujer
Zoning is an exercise of the state's police power-i.e., the power
of the state to regulate the activities of its citizens so as to protect the
public's health, safety, welfare, and morals.80 In Pennsylvania, the
predominant statutory provision which governs zoning is the
Municipalities Planning Code [MPC or Code],"' enabling legislation
by which the state delegates a portion of its police power to local
municipalities, authorizing them to exercise zoning power on behalf
of the Commonwealth. 8 2 The municipalities, as nonsovereign bodies,
are limited by this enabling legislation to the powers specifically del-
egated.8 3 Nonetheless, the delegation and the enabling legislation
are to be liberally construed.
8 4
When the municipalities exercise the power to zone, they are
subject to fourteenth amendment due process standards.8 5 Because a
80. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 241 n.3, 263 A.2d 395, 397
n.3 (1970); Sable Constr. Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 599, 607, 329 A.2d
912, 917 (1974).
81. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11202 (Purdon 1972 & Supp. 1979). The purpose of
the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code is to foster orderly community development.
Ellis School v. City of Pittsburgh, 4 Pa. Commw. Ct. 594, 598, 288 A.2d 844, 846 (1972).
Section 10105 of the Code sets out its purpose as follows:
It is the intent, purpose and scope of this act to protect and promote safety, health
and morals; to accomplish a coordinated development of municipalities, other than cities
of the first and second class; to provide for the general welfare by guiding and protecting
amenity, convenience, future governmental, economic, practical, and social and cultural
facilities, development and growth, as well as the improvement of governmental processes
and functions; to guide uses of land and struetures, type and location of streets, public
grounds and other facilities; and to permit municipalities, other than cities of the first and
second class, to minimize such problems as may presently exist or which may be fore-
seen. It is the further intent of this act that any recommendations made by any planning
agency to any governing body shall be advisory only.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10105 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
In Philadelphia, a first class city, the statutory enabling mechanism is the First Class City
Home Rule Act, id. § 13131-13157 (Purdon 1972 & Supp. 1979). This Act includes the power to
adopt a comprehensive plan for zoning purposes. See id. § 13131; Freed v. Power, 392 Pa. 195,
197, 139 A.2d 661, 662 (1958).
82. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10601 (Purdon 1972) (authorizing each municipality to
enact, amend, or repeal zoning ordinances to accomplish any purpose of the Act). The Code
enlarges the scope o the municipal zoning power beyond that of the police power. See DeCaro
v. Washington Township, 67 Berks L.J. 41, 43, aff'd, 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 252, 344 A.2d 725
(1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10604 (Purdon 1972 & Supp. 1979).
83. See Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367, 373, 200 A.2d 408, 412 (1964); Kline
v. City of Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 449-50, 68 A.2d 182, 186-87 (1949). The legislative grant of
zoning power to first class cities acts as a limit upon them as well. See School Dist. of Philadel-
phia v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 277, 280, 207 A.2d 864, 866 (1965).
84. See Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 49, 228 A.2d 169,
174 (1967). See also Calantoni & Sons, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 6 Pa. Commw. Ct. 521,
525 n.l, 297 A.2d 164, 166 n.1 (1972) (distinguishing state zoning enabling acts which are to be
liberally construed and local zoning ordinances which are to be strictly construed).
85. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1927).
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landowner has a right to use his property as he sees fit,8 6 the munici-
pality may not impose a burden beyond what is necessary to meet
police power objectives; that is to say, the municipality may not im-
pose unreasonable, arbitrary, or confiscatory conditions restricting the
use of the land.8 7 Thus, zoning ordinances enacted by local govern-
ment bodies will be upheld only if they bear a substantial relationship
to the promotion of the public health, safety, welfare, and morals.88
Under the MPC, land use control is essentially local, for the
planning function rests primarily with the municipalities. 89 In the
absence of the enactment of zoning ordinances by the municipalities,
a county may enact zoning laws. 90 However, later enactment of a
zoning ordinance by a municipality will supersede the county ordi-
nance. 91 Thus, the county does not have the power to impose par-
ticular land use objectives on the local government.
92
86. See id. at 188; National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 522, 215 A.2d 597, 607
(1965).
87. See National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 512, 215 A.2d 597, 602 (1965). The
United States Supreme Court has stated: "Legislatures may not, under the guise of the police
power, impose restrictions that are unnecessary and unreasonable upon the use of private prop-
erty or the pursuit of useful activities." Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928).
See also Landis v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 146, 149, 198 A.2d 574, 575 (1964); Robin
Corp. v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 386, 397, 332 A.2d 841, 847 (1975). Zoning
is intended to regulate uses; it may not regulate ownership. See Kaufman & Broad Inc. v. Board
of Supervisors, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 116, 120, 340 A.2d 909, 911 (1975). See generally Dublin
Properties v. Board of Comm'rs, 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 54, 342 A.2d 821 (1975).
88. See Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928); Nectow v. City of Cam-
bridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1927); Sylvester v. Pittsburgh Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 398 Pa.
216, 222, 157 A.2d 174, 178 (1959); Kline v. Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 451, 68 A.2d 182, 188
(1949); Calantoni & Sons, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 6 Pa. Commw. Ct. 521, 524, 297 A.2d
164, 166 (1972).
89. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10601 (Purdon 1972) (governing body may enact ordi-
nances to implement comprehensive plan and accomplish purposes of the MPC). The Code
maintains that the purposes of zoning are as follows:
(1) To promote, protect, and facilitate one or more of the following: the public
health, safety, morals, general welfare, coordinated and practical community develop-
ment, proper density of population, civil defense, disaster evacuation, airports, and na-
tional defense facilities, the provision of adequate light and air, police protection, vehicle
parking and loading space, transportation, water, sewerage, school, public grounds, and
other public requirements as well as
(2) To prevent one or more of the following: overcrowding of land, blight, danger
and congestion in travel and transportation, loss of health, life or property from fire,
flood, panic or other dangers. Zoning ordinances shall be made in accordance with an
overall program and with consideration for the character of the municipality, its various
parts and the suitability of the various parts for particular uses and structures.
Id. § 10604.
90. See id. § 10602.
91. See id. A county may only zone until the local authorities exercise their prerogative to
do so since "[t]he enactment of a zoning ordinance by any municipality, other than the county,
whose land is subject to county zoning shall act as a repeal pro tanto of the county zoning
ordinance, within the municipality adopting such ordinance." Id.
92. See Commonwealth v. Bucks County, 22 Bucks County L. Rep. 179, 185 (C.P. Pa.
1972), aff'd, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 295, 302 A.2d 897 (1973).
13
Boyd: Strategies in Zoning and Community Living Arrangements for Retard
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The zoning ordinances are passed following a hearing pursuant to
public notice, 93 and may regulate or prohibit, inter alia, the density
of population and the intensity of use, as well as make allowances for
special exceptions, variances, and conditional uses. 94 The local na-
ture of land use planning makes it especially likely to reflect the de-
sires of the community regarding the use of their land and the land
around them. 95 It is not likely, however, that it will reflect the
needs and desires of those who have thus far been excluded from the
community because these people presumably lack sufficient political
leverage to ensure that their needs are represented in the planning
decisions. For this reason, the retarded cannot expect the com-
munities to issue an invitation in the form of a zoning ordinance
which is specifically compatible with the placement of CLA's in
single-family areas. It is more probable that the retarded will have to
break into an already set residential area through challenges to the
existing plan for development.
Challenging or modifying the zoning of a particular piece of
property may be initiated in several ways under the MPC. A substan-
tive challenge to the ordinance itself may be raised by the filing of a
curative amendment directed at resolving the perceived problem. 96
The amendment is filed with the governing body of the municipality
and seeks a legislative resolution to the problem. 97 In the alterna-
tive, either a substantive challenge, or a modification of the applica-
tion of the zoning ordinance (e.g., a special exception), may be in-
itiated by seeking a zoning permit from the zoning hearing board. 98
From the zoning hearing board, the landowner or other persons ag-
grieved by the determination may appeal to the county court of
common pleas. 99 Under the statute, these are the exclusive means
93. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10607 (Purdon 1972) (providing for preparation of the
zoning ordinance, public hearing, and presentation to the governing body); id. § 10608 (provid-
ing for public hearing and subsequent vote by governing body within ninety days). Under the
Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, zoning ordinances may not be adopted without the approval
of the City Planning Commission. 351 Pa. Code § 2.2-307. The City Planning Commission
prepares the proposed ordinance and submits it to the mayor for transmission to the city coun-
cil. Id. § 4.4-601.
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10603 (Purdon Supp. 1979). See id. § 10912 (Purdon 1972)
(standards for variances); id. § 10914 (standards for special exceptions and conditional uses).
95. See Comment, Zoning the Mentally Retarded Into Single-Family Residential Areas, 1979
ARIz. L. REv. 385, 385; Chandler & Ross, supra note 6, at 311.
96. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
97. Id.
98. See id. § 10910 (Purdon 1972) (board shall hear challenges to the validity of a zoning
ordinance); id. § 10912 (board shall hear requests for variances); id. § 10913 (board shall hear
and decide requests for special exceptions).
99. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. §§ 5105(a)(2), 5571(b) (1978).
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for raising zoning challenges. 100 Once in the court of common pleas,
different statutory provisions apply for landowners and aggrieved per-
sons challenging either the validity or the application of the ordi-
nance.' 01 Other persons directly involved may also intervene.
10 2
The court of common pleas, after having heard the appeal, 10 3 may
grant, inter alia, permission for the use, or it may set aside the ordi-
nance, retaining jurisdiction to assure that its relief is complete. 10
4
The local nature of zoning legislation and adjudication provides
substantial local discretion with respect to the admission of group
homes. If resistance is anticipated, the reasons for the resistance must
be examined and the local ordinance must be evaluated so that the
appropriate response can be prepared. The first order of business be-
fore the zoning decisionmaker must be to present the benefits of the
group homes, explain their function, and discuss their positive ef-
fects. 10 5 The second step is to allay the fears which motivate public
resistance.
C. Community Resistance to CLA's: Reasons and Responses
The movement of the retarded from institutions into the com-
munity has made one fact very clear: the neighborhoods will resist
the establishment of group homes, despite the fact that most indi-
viduals say in the abstract that they support the idea of community
living arrangements. 10 6 Since zoning is a local, political function, it
tends to reflect parochial views. 10 7 Communities are under many
disincentives to open their doors to community living arrange-
100. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11001 (Purdon 1972); Mazuka v. American Oil Co., 383 Pa.
191, 196, 118 A.2d 142, 144 (1955) (court is limited in the scope of its jurisdiction to the
provision of the applicable zoning statutes and may not apply equitable principles); cf. Com-
monwealth v. Bucks County, 22 Bucks County L. Rep. 179, 181 (1972), aff'd, 8 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 295, 302 A.2d 897 (1973) (an exception to the exclusivity of the statutory procedures has
been recognized where the statutory remedy is not adequate or complete, or is nonexistent).
101. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11005 (Purdon Supp. 1979) (appeal by persons aggrieved
challenging validity of ordinance); id. § 11006 (appeal by landowner challenging decisions not
involving the validity of an ordinance); id. § 11007 (appeal by person aggrieved challenging
decisions not involving the validity of an ordinance).
102. See id. § 11009 (Purdon 1972).
103. See id. § 11010 (judge may hold hearing to receive additional evidence, but if he does
not, the findings of the governing body or the zoning hearing board may not be disturbed if
supported by substantial evidence).
104. See id. § 11011 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
105. See notes 14-16 and accompanying text supra.
106. See Bugbears, supra note 25, at 52. A study by the President's Commission on Mental
Retardation found that 85% of the general population said they would not object to a group home
on their block; however, 33% of the group homes actually established experienced community
opposition at their inception. Id.
107. See id. at 53. See also Kressel, supra note 23, at 145-46; Developmental Disabilities,
supra note 27, at 795-96.
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ments. 10 8 Resistance results from many unfounded prejudices about
"deviant" groups generally and from certain specific feared "attri-
butes" of retarded individuals-for instance, that crime rates will
climb, that the residential character of the neighborhood will be de-
stroyed, and that property values will drop. 10 9 To quell this first
fear, it is sufficient to note that crime rates have not, in fact, risen in
neighborhoods with group homes. 110 With respect to the second and
third fears, however, a more detailed response is necessary."'
Zoning authorities assume that community living arrangements
are incompatible with the established residential patterns."12  De-
struction of the residential character of the neighborhood might be
justification for exclusion under the police power of zoning if it actu-
ally occurred; 113 however, unless a disability ghetto begins to
emerge, 1 4 the introduction of a group home into a neighborhood will
not change its character appreciably. 115  Even if a ghetto is forming,
this is easily remedied by incorporating a dispersal requirement in
the local ordinance, which is beneficial to both the residents of the
group home and to others in the neighborhood; the mere fact that a
ghetto seems to be emerging, however, does not justify exclusionary
practices. 116
Neighborhood residents also fear that plummeting property val-
ues will result from the local establishment of a group home. 117  This
objection, though arguable in theory, 118 has been repeatedly dis-
proved. Perhaps due in part to self-consciousness resulting from the
108. See Developmental Disabilities, supra note 27, at 796; notes 24 & 25 and accompanying
text supra.
109. See Kressel, supra note 23, at 145; Lippincott, supra note 7, at 769; Bugbears, supra
note 25, at 53.
110. See Kressel, supra note 23, at 145-46. This fear seems to apply to group homes gener-
ally, not simply to group homes for the retarded. Telephone interview with Marilyn Mennis,
supra note 8. See Zoning for Community Residences, supra note 7, at 320. The feared crime of
sexual deviancy associated with the retarded is an historical anachronism which led to the crea-
tion of the large, isolated institution. See A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 332-86
(2d ed. 1949); Wolfensburger, supra note 2, at 100-05, 112-15. In addition, it was sometimes
assumed without scientific basis that the retarded are carriers of disease. See Chandler & Ross,
supra note 6, at 315.
111. See notes 112-21 and accompanying text infra.
112. See Kressel, supra note 23, at 145.
113. See Bugbears, supra note 25, at 53. See also Kressel, supra note 23, at 145.
114. See notes 32-36 and accompanying supra.
115. See Bugbears, supra note 25, at 53. This result may be due in part to the fact that the
residents of the group homes have little to do with the residents of the neighborhood and vice
versa. Id.
116. See Zoning for Community Residences, supra note 7, at 320.
117. Id.; Bugbears, supra note 25, at 53; Telephone interview with Marilyn Mennis, supra
note 8.
118. Cf. Phillips v. Griffiths, 366 Pa. 468, 471, 77 A.2d 375, 377 (1951) ("protection of prop-
erty values is an incident of zoning laws").
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fear of community opposition, group home residents tend to give
their properties excellent care. 119 Empirical data indicate that prop-
erty values have remained constant or have improved over time in
areas where group homes have been established.' 20 Additionally,
real estate turnovers have not increased. 121
Until this data is accepted by the public as true, resistance will
continue. The ever-increasing need for group homes, however, can-
not await the effects of public education about the deinstitutionaliza-
tion imperative. At present, it isestimated that fifty percent of the
planned group homes are blocked at the outset by members of the
community whose resistance eventually causes abandonment of these
projects. 122  In the past, the basic means of working around this diffi-
culty has been to resort to the use of apartments as the means of
providing community living arrangements for the retarded.' 23
Assuming that community resistance exists, and that attempts at
education have failed, the question becomes how to deal with the
resistance in the most efficacious manner. The extent and type of
resistance must first be gauged. If the sponsors explain the nature
and purpose of the group homes, acceptance may still be possi-
ble.' 24 Realistically, this is an unlikely result and a process which
may be self-defeating, for there appears to be a correlation between
preestablishment community activity by proponents and the de-
velopment of organized opposition to the establishment of the com-
munity living arrangement.
125
If conciliation fails and the area is not a politically weak, transi-
tory neighborhood where group homes are often established, 126 ma-
nipulation of the zoning process to prevent the establishment of the
119. See Bugbears, supra note 25, at 53.
120. See id; Study of Property Values in Allegheny County (on file with author); Abstract of
study by Dr. Julian Wolpert, Princeton University, Professor of Geography and Urban Planning
(1977) (on file with author).
121. See Kressel, supra note 23, at 146; Bugbears, supra note 25, at 53.
122. See Bugbears, supra note 25, at 53.
123. See Developmental Disabilities, supra note 27, at 796 n. 14. Philadelphia County now
requires the use of rental property for group homes because of the difficulties and delays en-
tailed in zoning and property ownership. Telephone Interview with Vivian Lotz, former Direc-
tor of the Southwest Community Action Program, Philadelphia, Pa. (Mar. 23, 1979). The
movement to rentals in other states has not ended the problem. See Rosen v. Birchwood As-
soc., Case No. (S)H-D-60289-78 (N.Y. State Division of Human Rights, Dec. 18, 1979) (apart-
ment owner's denial of lease to a group home constitutes a violation of state Human Rights Act);
cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(h)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1979) (Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
makes unlawful the discriminatory practice of refusing to lease to individuals because of hand-
icap or disability).
124. See Kressel, supra note 23, at 146. But see Lippincott, supra note 7, at 774 n.41.
125. See Bugbears, supra note 25, at 53.
126. See Zoning for Community Residences, supra note 7, at 319.
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home must be anticipated. 127  It is likely that the residents of the
CLA or the sponsors will be forced to come into contact with the
municipal zoning system as either petitioners for a zoning permit or
as defendants in an action to enjoin the use of the property.
128
Where the ordinance does not permit the intended use, the owner of
the house might wish to take the offensive and seek a curative
amendment on the ground that the ordinance, if applied to the group
home, would violate either his constitutional right to use his property
as he sees fit, 129 or the rights of the residents to minimally adequate
habilitation. 130 Unless the ordinance specifically states that group
homes for the retarded will not be permitted under any cir-
cumstances, it would seem to be the better route to proceed through
the municipal appellate process.'
3 '
In the application for the zoning permit, the landowner must
come out with all his or her guns blazing. 132 The evidence must
clearly show that all reasons for resistance are frivolous and that the
group home operates much like a normal family. If neighbors exert
opposition, it is doubtful that they would be able to factually support
their objections. 133 As a practical matter, however, a preponderance
of the facts may not outweigh the political considerations which may
underlie the zoning decision. Unless the landowner is willing to make
127. See Lippincott, supra note 7, at 774-75.
128. See id. at 773-74.
129. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1927); National Land & Inv. Co. v.
Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); note 86 and accompanying text supra.
130. See cases cited notes 20 & 21 supra. Third-party standing difficulties could be an obsta-
cle for landowners in asserting the rights of the residents. Cf. Note, Housing for the Elderly:
Constitutional Limitations and Our Obligations, 5 FLA. S.U.L. REv. 423, 440 (1977) (open
question on third-party rights in federal suit challenging the constitutionality of exclusionary
zoning practices).
131. See notes 98-105 and accompanying text supra.
132. One author explained the need for a comprehensive presentation as follows:
In preparing for the hearing before the planning commission, the attorney should con-
sider securing testimony on the following matters: (1) a detailed description of the plans
for the group home, including number of residents, degree of retardation, screening pro-
cedures, staff-to-resident ratios, and plans for daily activity of the residents; (2) if the
home is to be constructed rather than set in an already-constructed dwelling, architectural
and landscaping plans; (3) state requirements for licensing of group homes, preferably
presented by a representative of the state licensing department; (4) psychological evidence
on the characteristics of mentally retarded people, focusing in particular on the fears and
questions raised by opponents of the community home; (5) evidence from a real estate
appraiser and/or owners and neighbors of other community homes that such homes do not
lower local property values; and (6) the recommendations of influential members of the
community.
Lippincott, supra note 7, at 775.
133. Two commentators have observed: "It is unlikely that the defenders of the local zoning
restriction could create a record of anything more than fears over having mentally retarded
people in the community. Fear is not sufficient to justify an exclusion based on the general
welfare." Chandler & Ross, supra note 6, at 329.
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a conciliation of some sort, 134 the opposition may prevail before the
zoning officer or the zoning hearing board.
Once the controversy has gone beyond the municipal administra-
tive stage, the retarded individuals may enter the controversy, not
as "persons aggrieved" by the decision, 135 but as interested interven-
ing parties. 136 Also, it is not until this point that the rights of the
persons truly aggrieved by a decision adverse to the CLA will be
addressed. It is submitted that landowners, unless they are an advo-
cacy group for the retarded, may not be willing to undertake this
potentially expensive appellate process, regardless of the support of
outside agencies. 1 37  Accordingly, Part III discusses how to work
through existing zoning ordinances to achieve placement of CLA's in
the community. Part IV considers an alternative available when the
provider of the service is the state-i.e., the argument that principles
of governmental immunity exempt the state when performing its pa-
rens patriae duty from the operation of local zoning ordinances. Fi-
nally, Part V will examine pending and proposed legislation to clarify
the relationship of CLA's to local zoning ordinance classifications.
III. DEALING WITH THE ZONING LAWS As THEY ARE
A. Meeting the Ordinance Definitions: Residence by
Right as a Permitted Use-The Family-Equivalent Analysis
Since the residents of group homes do function as a family, the
simplest and most logical argument for establishing such a living
arrangement-one that avoids the complex statutory and constitu-
tional issues-is that the group home constitutes a family use of the
property within the definition of the ordinance. This "permitted use"
approach has several favorable aspects. The use is one of right which
may be established and proceed without the imprimatur of the local
body. Therefore, unless a zoning permit for renovations is neces-
134. One group home established in Philadelphia agreed to place a restrictive covenant in
the deed to return the home to a "single-family" use upon its sale. Telephone interview with
Vivian Lotz, supra note 8.
135. Although the retarded individuals might be aggrieved by the result, a precondition to
the ability to appeal is that the person be aggrieved by a "use or development permitted on the
land of another." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 11005, 11007 (Purdon Supp. 1979) (emphasis
added). Thus, the only group benefiting from this provision of the statute would be the
neighbors in opposition.
136. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11009 (Purdon 1972). In this situation, the landowner
(provider) must make the record below and file the appeal before the retarded clients may
assert their rights.
137. Lippincott, supra note 7, at 772.
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sary, 13 the onus is on the persons who wish to prevent the intended
use as a group home to initiate a challenge, rather than on the pro-
vider of the service or the residents themselves to secure approval for
the use.139 This allocation of the burden necessitates organized op-
position and, thus, may help minimize resistance from the outset.
140
Assuming that the use is challenged, the actual question at issue
in terms of strict land use planning theory is whether or not a family
use of the property is involved; 141 the issue generally addressed,
however, is whether or not the group seeking residence is actually a
family. 142  The group's success in qualifying as a permitted use will
depend on the extent to which the advocate is able to direct the
court's attention away from the issue of what is a family and focus it
on the more general and proper issue of what is a family use. Alterna-
tively, if the controversy is riveted around the issue of whether the
group qualifies as a family, the chances of success seem to depend on
the specificity with which the ordinance defines "family."
Consider an ordinance which uses the word "family" without
supplementary definitions. 143 In the absence of a definition of the
138. See Group House v. Board of Zoning and Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 266, 380 N.E.2d
207, 208, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377, 378 (1978) (provider initiated action by applying for a building
permit when structural modifications were necessary to house group home).
139. See Lippincott, supra note 7, at 773-74.
140. As one study has found, notice to the community allows it to better prepare to challenge
the group home and thus offer more opposition, but that once established, the group home
tends to be accepted. See Bugbears, supra note 25, at 52. Therefore, it appears that the best
solution would seem to be to work within the zoning laws so that the opposition must initiate
the action.
141. See Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 693, 699 (1976); note 87 supra; note 152 infra.
142. Id. Despite this general tendency, some courts have invalidated zoning ordinances that
distinguish between biologically related families and group foster homes on the grounds that
regulating the internal composition of a residence has "too tenuous a connection to land use and
so is unauthorized by the state enabling act." Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARv. L.
REv. 1427, 1576 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Zoning]. If one were to look only at the use, it
would necessarily follow that a much broader group would be able to occupy the residence
since "even the most narrowly defined family group may, arguably, make a family use of the
premises which involves occupancy by others, such as guests or boarders." Annot., supra note
141, at 699.
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), the Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of a single-family zone where "family" was limited to one or more persons
related by blood, adoption, or marriage, or not more than two unrelated persons living and
cooking together as a single house-keeping unit. Id. The Court found that the use of such a
"single-family zone" did not violate constitutional equal protection standards when applied to a
group of unrelated students living together in one house. Id. at 7-10. At least one commentator
has found that this Supreme Court decision raises difficulties for the attorney utilizing a "single-
family" argument. See Lippincott, supra note 7, at 770-72. It is submitted, however, that the
decision in Belle Terre does not affect matters relating to statutory construction under state law
because the plaintiffs in that case apparently did not argue that they fit within the ordinance's
definition of a family. 416 U.S. at 7.
143. It should be noted that even when the term is actually defined within the statute, courts
have been known to totally ignore the definition. See Zoning, supra note 142, at 1577.
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family, courts generally use a broad construction of the term.' 44
Where such an ordinance exists, courts in other states have held that
a group home, intended to provide a homelike environment for re-
tarded persons, is the functional and factual equivalent of a natural
family and, thus, is a permitted use within a single-family residential
zone.' 4 5 The underlying rationale for this trend has been explained
as follows:
So long as an institution is small, state courts seem less concerned
that it may be somewhat less congenial to a residential neighbor-
hood than a family would be, and more concerned with the func-
tion it serves. That is, . . . state courts seem most interested in
protecting those institutions which, like families, raise children and
shelter their members from social and economic adversity.
146
Other factors which may affect whether a group of retarded per-
sons will be found to qualify as a family include, inter alia, whether
the residents are children or adults, whether residence in the group
home is a permanent or temporary placement, and whether habilita-
tive services are provided on or off the premises. 147 The family-
equivalent analysis is factually easier to propose, and probably more
likely to be accepted by the community, if the residents of the home
are children,'14  although groups of adults have been found to be a
144. See YWCA v. Board of Adjustment, 121 N.J. Super. 384, 390, 341 A.2d 356, 359 (L.
Div. 1975), aff'd, 141 N.J. Super. 315 (App. Div. 1976); Annot., supra note 141, at 699-700;
Zoning, supra note 142, at 1576-77.
145. See, e.g., Brady v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 2d 69, 77-78, 19 Cal. Rptr. 242,
247-48 (1962); State ex rel. Ello v. Liddle, 520 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Newark v.
Johnson, 70 N.J. Super. 381, 386, 175 A.2d 500, 502 (L. Div. 1961); Group House v. Board of
Zoning and Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 274, 380 N.E.2d 207, 209-10, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377, 380
(1978); Village of Freeport v. Association for the Help of Retarded Children, 94 Misc. 2d 1048,
1049, 406 N.Y.S.2d 221, 222-23, aff'd, 60 A.D.2d 644, 400 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1977).
146. Zoning, supra note 142, at 1577.
147. See County of Lake v. Gateway Houses Foundation, 19 111. App. 3d 318, 311 N.E.2d 371
(1974). Habilitation services on the premises may cause the home to be designated a business
use. See notes 198-201 and accompanying text infra. Services off-premises may frustrate the
home's attempt to qualify as an educational use. See notes 202-06 and accompanying text infra.
148. See, e.g., City of White Plains v. Ferraroli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974). In explaining its family equivalent analysis, the Ferraroli court stated:
Whether a family be organized along ties of blood or formal adoptions, or be a simi-
larly structured group sponsored by the State, as is the group home, should not be con-
sequential in meeting the test of the zoning ordinance. So long as the group home bears
the generic character of a family unit as a relatively permanent household, and is not a
framework for transients or transient living, it conforms to the purpose of the ordinance.
Id. at 305-06, 313 N.E.2d at 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 452-53 (citations omitted). The court con-
cluded:
In short, an ordinance may restrict a residential zone to occupancy by stable families
occupying single-family homes, but neither by express provision nor construction may it
limit the definition of family to exclude a household which in every but a biological sense
is a single family. The minimal arrangement to meet the test of a zoning provision, as this
one, is a group headed by a householder caring for a reasonable number of children as
one would be likely to find in a biologically unitary family.
Id. at 306, 313 N.E.2d at 758-59, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 453 (citations omitted).
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family for purposes of zoning. 149  The residence of adults in a CLA
will have a character of permanence, a factor of great importance to
the courts, 150 which may be lacking when children are the residents.
Both situations present facts from which it may be concluded that the
CLA constitutes a family or a family use. 15 1 Additionally, the
number of residents should be limited to a reasonable number.
Above all, the court's attention should be focused on the use of the
residence, rather than on the relationship among those who live
there. 1
52
An ordinance with a brief but nonspecific definition of the family
may be used in a similar fashion. Although the courts in other juris-
dictions have not been entirely in agreement depending upon the
group involved, 153 they have held that an ordinance which defines a
family as "a single housekeeping unit" does not bar group homes for
retarded persons. 154 The scope of the uses permitted under this
type of ordinance is still not entirely clear. One Pennsylvania court,
applying an ordinance which required, inter alia, that the residents
share a "domestic bond," found that the zoning hearing board did not
err in holding that college students residing as a single household
unit do not satisfy the ordinance. 155 The precedential value of the
case is questionable, given the unusual wording of the ordinance 156
and the somewhat transient character of residence by students.
157 If
149. See Living Resources Corp. v. Burns, 91 Misc. 2d 919, 921, 398 N.Y.S.2d 928, 929
(App. Div. 1977).
150. See Planning and Zoning Comm'n v. Synanon Foundation, 153 Conn. 305, 309, 216
A.2d 442, 443 (1966); City of White Plains v. Ferraroli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 306, 313 N.E.2d 756,
758, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 453 (1974); Little Neck Community Ass'n v. Working Organization for
Retarded Children, 52 A.D.2d 90, 93-94, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364, 366-67, appeal denied, 40 N.Y.2d
803 (1976). See also Zoning, supra note 142, at 1577-78.
151. See generally Comment, Exclusionary Zoning and its Effects on Group Homes in Areas
Zoned for Single Family Dwellings, 24 KAN. L. REv. 677, 685-88 (1976).
152. See Comment, supra note 151, at 686. As the New York Court of Appeals has stated,
"[z]oning is intended to control types of housing and living and not the genetic or intimate
internal family relations of human beings." City of White Plains v. Ferraroli, 34 N.Y.2d 300,
305, 313 N.E.2d 756, 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452 (1974). See notes 141-42 and accompanying
text supra.
153. Zoning, supra note 142, at 1577-78.
154. See, e.g., Hessling v. City of Broomfield, 193 Colo. 124, 127-28, 563 P.2d 12, 14 (1977);
Oliver v. Zoning Comm'n, 31 Conn. Supp. 197, 205, 326 A.2d 841, 845 (C.P. 1974); Robertson
v. Western Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954); Township of Washington
v. Central Berger Community Mental Health Center, Inc., 156 N.J. Super. 388, 419, 383 A.2d
1194, 1209 (1978).
155. See Humphrey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 36 Lehigh County L.J. 308, 309-11 (C.P. Pa.
1975). The ordinance defined a family as "[a] collective body of two (2) or more persons doing
their own cooking and living as a separate housekeeping unit in relationship based upon birth,
marriage, adoption or other domestic bonds." Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
156. See note 155 supra.
157. See Humphrey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 36 Lehigh County L.J. 308, 309 (C.P. Pa. 1975).
The court also stated that there was evidence in the record that the property had been used as
a boarding house in the past. Id.
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nothing else, the case reiterates the idea that successful utilization of
the family-equivalent analysis requires that the advocate focus the
court's attention on the use of the property, rather than on the rela-
tionship of the occupants.'
5l
Although Pennsylvania courts have never directly addressed the
issue, the flexibility with which they have applied the definition of
"family" in other contexts appears to support the argument that the
group home constitutes a family use within the definition of the ordi-
nance. 159 The Pennsylvania definition of "family" applied in nonzon-
ing situations, is broad, and encompasses more than mere blood rela-
tionships.
Family is not a technical word, nor can it be given any techni-
cal meaning .... In a very common, if the most usual sense, it
includes all the persons of the same blood who are dwelling to-
gether in one household, and in many cases the condition of the
same blood is not requisite .... 160
Using this definition, at least one Pennsylvania court has found
that a woman living with a family but not related to it either by blood
or marriage is still to be considered a member of the family. 16 1 The
definition of "household" is even broader in scope. 162 The key to the
definition is the existence of a single head or management of the
group,' 63 much like the role of houseparents in a community living
arrangement.
Factors considered in the determination of the existence of a
family include whether purchases are made by the group or by indi-
158. See Comment, supra note 151, at 685-87. But see Pennsylvania George Junior Republic
v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 151, 389 A.2d 261 (1978). The George Junior
Republic court addressed the issue of whether a home for juvenile offenders and unmanageable
boys constituted a "one family dwelling" within the meaning of the local ordinance. Id. at 153,
389 A.2d at 262. Although the court concentrated on the definition of a dwelling rather than of
a family, it found the use to be an institutional home, specifically excluded by the ordinance
from the definition of dwelling. Id. at 153-54, 389 A.2d at 262. No facts or cases supporting the
court's conclusion of the institutional nature of the use were given. Id.
159. Although the definition of a family is often an issue in such areas as the construction of
wills and the award of public benefits, it is submitted that the public policy which justifies the
loose construction of "family" in those areas is no more compelling than the public policy sup-
porting minimally adequate habilitation for the retarded. See, e.g., Way Estate, 379 Pa. 421, 109
A.2d 164 (1954) (construction of language in a will); Beilstein v. Beilstein, 194 Pa. 152, 45 A. 73
(1899) (same).
160. Beilstein v. Beilstein, 194 Pa. 152, 155, 45 A. 73, 74 (1899).
161. See Way Estate, 379 Pa. 421, 436-37, 109 A.2d 164, 172 (1954) (construction of lan-
guage in a will).
162. See, e.g., Brovdy v. J. & L. Steel Corp., 145 Pa. Super. Ct. 602, 605, 21 A.2d 437, 438
(1941) (workmen's compensation); Hoff v. Hoff, 132 Pa. Super. Ct. 431, 435, 1 A.2d 506, 507
(1938) (construction of a will).
163. See Bair v. Robinson, 108 Pa. 247, 249 (1885) (construction of a will). See also cases
cited note 162 supra.
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viduals, whether property ownership of household items is in the
group or in the individuals, and whether entertainment is done as a
group or individually. 164  With the emphasis on the typical function-
ing of a contemporary family, the activities performed by members of
a group home fit well within Pennsylvania's view of the family as a
social and economic unit. 165 Wherever it is possible to do so without
curtailing habilitative programs, the structure of the home should be
geared to fall within the definition of the family.
B. Meeting the Ordinance Definitions:
Residence by Special Exception
When the ordinance defines the family in terms of specific de-
grees of consanguinity or affinity, an alternative to asserting the
family-equivalent analysis might be available if the zoning ordinance
includes a provision for "special exceptions."1
66
164. See Hoff v. Hoff, 132 Pa. Super. Ct. 431, 436, 1 A.2d 506, 508 (1938).
165. See notes 143-63 and accompanying text supra.
166. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10603 (Purdon Supp. 1979). Courts and commentators
have noted that the term "special exception" is a misnomer. See, e.g., Tullo v. Township of
Millburn, 54 N.J. Super. 483, 490, 149 A.2d 620, 624-25 (1959); D. MANDELKER & R. CUN-
NINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 659-60 (1979). What is some-
times called special exception is a use permitted by the ordinance but only if specific conditions
are met. See D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAw 103
(1975). It is not, as the name implies, an exception from the operation of the statute. This type
of flexible zoning is also called a "special use" or a "conditional use," with authorities expressing
a preference for one of these terms rather than "special exception." See Tullo v. Township of
Millburn, 54 N.J. Super. 483, 490, 149 A.2d 620, 624-25 (1959); Depue v. City of Clinton, 160
N.W.2d 860, 863 (S. Ct. Iowa 1968). The classic explanation of this type of use was provided in
Tullo v. Township of Millburn:
In order that our subsequent discussion of the issues in this case may be viewed in their
proper legal perspective, we interrupt the factual narrative to comment on the true na-
ture of a "special exception" under our statute. The term might well be said to be a
misnomer. "Special uses" or "special use permits" would be more accurate. The theory is
that certain uses, considered by the local legislative body to be essential or desirable for
the welfare of the community and its citizenry or substantial segments of it, are entirely
appropriate and not essentially incompatible with the basic uses in any zone (or in certain
particular zones), but not at every or any location therein or without restrictions or condi-
tions being imposed by reason of special problems the use or its particular location in
relation to neighboring properties presents from a zoning standpoint, such as traffic con-
gestion, safety, health, noise, and the like. The enabling act therefore permits the local
ordinance to require approval of the local administrative agency as to the location of such
use within the zone. If the board finds compliance with the standards or requisites set
forth in the ordinance, the right to the exception exists, subject to such specific safeguard-
ing conditions as the agency may impose by reason of the nature, location and incidents of
the particular use. Without intending here to be inclusive or to prescribe limits, the uses
so treated are generally those serving considerable numbers of people, such as private
schools, clubs, hospitals and even churches, as distinguished from governmental struc-
tures or activities on the one hand and strictly individual residences or businesses on the
other. This method of zoning treatment is also frequently extended to certain unusual
kinds of strictly private business or activity which, though desirable and compatible, may
by their nature present peculiar zoning problems or have unduly unfavorable effect on
24
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The special exception process is highly politicized, despite legis-
lative guidelines. 167  In drawing up its zoning ordinance, the govern-
ing body may include a list of uses to be treated as special exceptions
in a particular zone, and the standards to be met before the use will
be permitted; 168 neither the list nor the standards need be the same
for each zone in the municipality. The application is made to the
zoning hearing board which may not arbitrarily reject an application
that clearly meets the standards of the ordinance and does not pose a
danger to the public health, safety, welfare, or morals. 169 The zon-
ing hearing board may impose additional conditions if it deems them
necessary. 170 An ordinance may also list uses which are prohibited
in certain zones. 171 The ability of group homes to qualify as special
exceptions, and the uses with which group homes should avoid com-
parison will now be examined.
The designation of the group home as a business use is one
which is to be avoided. Because the operator of a group home is often
a private person who owns or rents the property and is paid by a
state agency for the room and board provided, 172 a group home might
be characterized as a business enterprise analogous to a boarding
their neighbors if not specifically regulated. Gasoline stations . . . are an example of this
second category. The point is that such special uses are permissive ....
54 N.J. Super. at 490-91, 149 A.2d at 624-25 (1959).
Pennsylvania law permits municipalities to include in their ordinance a provision for "spe-
cial exceptions" (the statutory terminology). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10603 (Purdon Supp.
1979). Like the enabling legislation in Tullo, the Pennsylvania MPC gives the local zoning
agency, here the Zoning Hearing Board, the power to hear and decide applications for special
exceptions based on the standards and criteria expressed in the ordinance. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, § 10913 (Purdon 1972). Unfortunately, the MPC also states that an ordinance may contain
provisions for "conditional uses." See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10603 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
Unlike the special exceptions which are decided by the Zoning Hearing Board, conditional uses
are granted or denied by the governing body. See id. It is submitted that a conditional use, as
the term is used in Pennsylvania, is more akin to a valid "floating zone" than to the type of
special use described in the above quote from Tullo or discussed in the accompanying text. In
the floating zone situation, the ordinance creates a zone with certain characteristics but does not
apply it to any tract. See D. HACMAN, supra, at 117. It "floats" until a landowner asks that it be
attached to his or her property. Id. This attachment is accomplished by way of a second ordi-
nance. Id. Hence because only the governing body can amend the local zoning ordinance, and
because the approval of a conditional use qua floating zone requires an amendment to the
ordinance, Pennsylvania law provides that the governing body decides conditional use applica-
tions.
167. See Lippincott, supra note 7, at 773-74.
168. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10603 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
169. See City Planning Comm'n v. Threshold, Inc., 12 Pa. Commw. Ct. 104, 108-09, 315
A.2d 311, 313 (1974); Simon v. Doylestown Borough Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 17 Bucks
County L. Rep. 103, 108 (C.P. Pa. 1967).
170. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10913 (Purdon 1972).
171. See. id. § 10603 (Purdon 1972 & Supp. 1979).
172. Chandler & Ross, supra note 6, at 308.
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home, 173 despite the obvious distinctions between them. Although it
is more likely to be found to be a business if habilitation is provided
by an outside agency or separate entity coming into the home, 174
some courts have also characterized it as a business use when habili-
tation is provided inside the home by CLA staff.175 Rather than con-
centrating on the use of the property, the zoning officials are more
likely to focus on the nature of the operator. On this basis, adminis-
trative bodies have found state licensed and supported group homes
to be a business use of the property. 176
Two other potentially dangerous classifications are a hospital and
a sanitarium because these uses are sometimes totally excluded from
residential areas and relegated to high-density zones. 177 Educational
uses are more likely to be permitted within single-family residential
districts.
If the nature of the use is seriously considered, group homes
would seem to be an educational use, as well as a single-family use.
In the area of educational use, the Pennsylvania courts have gone a
little further in defining the pertinent terms than in the area of
single-family residential use. 178 Prior decisions related to this area
reflected the popular conception of the retarded which lumped them
with the mentally ill; therefore, these decisions were not receptive to
this handicapped group. 179 All rehabilitative facilities were seen as
performing the function of treating a deficiency, rather than as pro-
viding education, and thus were classified as sanitaria. 180 It was not
until very recently that the basis of an argument for group homes as
an educational use emerged.
The definition of an educational use employed by the Pennsyl-
vania courts 181 enables the proponents of group homes to avoid two
173. Seaton v. Clifford, 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 52, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779, 782 (1972); Browndale
Int'l, Ltd. v. Board of Adjustment, 60 Wis. 2d 182, 208 N.W.2d 121, 131 (1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 936 (1974); Chandler & Ross, supra note 6, at 313. But see Kastendike v. Baltimore
Ass'n for Retarded Children, 267 Md. 389, 401-03, 297 A.2d 745, 751-52 (1972).
174. See Chandler & Ross, supra note 6, at 308.
175. See Browndale Int'l, Ltd. v. Board of Adjustment, 60 Wis. 2d 182, 201, 208 N.W.2d
121, 121 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). See also Chandler & Ross, supra note 6, at
308.
176. See Friedman, supra note 28, at 1095.
177. See Chandler & Ross, supra note 6, at 313-14. Cf. Montgomery County Mental Health
Clinics v. Norristown Borough, 86 Montg. County L. Rep. 194, 197 (C.P. Pa. 1965) (mental
health clinic held to be a hospital).
178. See, e.g., Gilden Appeal, 406 Pa. 484, 492, 178 A.2d 562, 566 (1962); Appeal of St.
Sophia Religious Ass'n, 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 237, 238-39, 365 A.2d 1389, 1390 (1976); Burgoon
v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 2 Pa. Commw. Ct. 238, 248-49, 277 A.2d 837, 841 (1971).
179. See, e.g., Devereaux Foundation, Inc., Zoning Case, 351 Pa. 478, 41 A.2d 744 (1945).
180. See id.
181. See Gilden Appeal, 406 Pa. 484, 178 A.2d 562 (1962).
[VOL. 25: p. 273
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss2/3
ZONING FOR RETARDED CITIZENS
pitfalls which are inescapable in other states. First, in Pennsylvania,
the likelihood of a use being designated as educational is not affected
by questions of public or private ownership and operation, 182 for the
courts will look to the nature of the use rather than to the identity of
the owner. 183 Secondly, before an educational use can be found to
be a prohibited business use in Pennsylvania, the ordinance must
specifically require that the facility be noncommercial, 18 4 rather than
requiring a consideration of the general factor of relative commer-
cialism as is mandated in other jurisdictions.
185
When not specifically defined within the zoning ordinance, a
permitted educational use will be broadly construed.' 8 6 The case in
which the Pennsylvania definition of educational use was first enun-
ciated was Gilden Appeal.'8 7  In Gilden, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court considered a special exception application for a day-school that
taught learning-disabled children in Chester County.' 8 8 The local
zoning hearing board had found this school to be a sanitarium and,
hence, to be prohibited under the local ordinance.' 8 9 Following ap-
peals by both sides, 190 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately
held that the school was an educational use, not a sanitarium, and
adopted the following definition of an educational use:
The word [educational] taken in its full sense, is a broad, com-
prehensive term, and may be particularly directed to either men-
tal, moral or physical faculties, but in its broadest and best sense it
embraces them all, and includes not merely the instructions re-
ceived at school, college, or university, but the whole course of
training-moral, intellectual and physical. 191
182. In most jurisdictions, if a facility is publicly owned and operated, it is generally more
likely to be designated as an educational use. Annot., 64 A.L.R. 3d 1087, 1092 (1975).
183. Burgoon v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 2 Pa. Commw. Ct. 238, 245-46, 277 A.2d 837, 842
(1971). See also Devereaux Foundation, Inc., Zoning Case, 351 Pa. 478, 488-89, 41 A.2d 744,
748-49 (1945) (Jones, J., dissenting). In attacking the majority which overruled the granting of a
variance to a school for mentally deficient children, the dissent in Devereaux argued:
In order that mental weakness or deficiency of pupils may have bearing on the reason
for discrimination between educational institutions within the contemplation of the same
zoning ordinance, there must be something in connection with the mental condition
which offers or fairly suggests a threat to the health, safety, or morals of the community.
Id.
184. Burgoon v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 2 Pa. Commw. Ct. 238, 245-47, 277 A.2d 837, 841-42
(1971).
185. Annot., supra note 182, at 1091-92.
186. See, e.g., Gilden Appeal, 406 Pa. 484, 492, 178 A.2d 562, 566 (1962); Appeal of St.
Sophia Religious Ass'n, 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 237, 238-39, 365 A.2d 1389, 1390 (1976); Burgoon
v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 2 Pa. Commw. Ct. 238, 248-49, 277 A.2d 837, 841 (1971). See also
Temple Univ. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 191, 195, 199 A.2d 415, 417 (1964).
187. 406 Pa. 484, 178 A.2d 562 (1962).
188. Id. at 487, 178 A.2d at 564.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 492, 178 A.2d at 566 (citation omitted).
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This general definition, based on physical or intellectual train-
ing, 192 would seem to encompass habilitation of the retarded. 193 In
Gilden, the court was impressed by the fact that the children in-
volved had the potential to become self-sufficient members of soci-
ety. 194  If presented with a case dealing with group homes for the
mentally retarded, the court might be equally impressed with evi-
dence regarding the degree of self-sufficiency which can be attained
in a community living arrangement. 195
Distinguishing habilitation from treatment, one lower court in
Pennsylvania has determined habilitative services to be an educa-
tional use. 196 The court reasoned that habilitation is educational be-
cause it improves the normal condition of the individual, while treat-
ment is designed to restore an individual to a normal condition.
197
192. See also Appeal of St. Sophia Religious Ass'n, 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 237, 240, 365 A.2d
1389, 1391 (1976) (interpreting Gilden to include as an educational use facilities which offer
either mental, moral, or physical training, and not to require all three); Burgoon Zoning Hear-
ing Bd., 2 Pa. Commw. Ct. 238, 244, 277 A.2d 837, 841 (1971) (same).
193. Despite the adoption of this broad definition, the court in Gilden also heavily em-
phasized similarities between the school tinder its consideration and a "normal" public
school, stressing the "normality" of the children involved, the similarity of the subject matter
taught, and the absence of any treatment on the premises:
The Center is devoted to the education of children from five to twelve years of age. These
children are physically and mentally normal but, somehow, just miss being sufficiently
alert to carry on progressively as normal children should. They cannot communicate their
ideas with the facility and celerity associated with children of their age, but they are not
to be classified as mentally deficient and certainly in no way to be regarded as lacking in
proper moral fiber and behavior.
406 Pa. at 488, 178 A.2d at 564 (footnotes omitted). The court also noted that none of the
children had an I.Q. below 70. Id. at 490, 178 A.2d at 565.
194. See id. at 491, 178 A.2d at 566. The court somewhat poetically emphasized that
[t]here are hospitals and sanitaria located in the valley of tragedy to care for children who
have been struck down by cerebral paralysis and other dread ailments. At the top of the
hill is the public school system for physically and mentally normal children. Half way up
the hill we find the Center devoted to those children who have the potentialities to
become excellent citizens but who, neglected and forsaken, might well tumble down the
hill into the institutions for the hopelessly handicapped. The Center trains its children to
climb the hill to the normal schools where they will take their places and no one will ever
know that they had ever skirted on the precipice of disaster.
Id.
195. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
196. School Lane Hills, Inc. v. East Hempfield Township Zoning Bd., 18 Pa. Commw. Ct.
519, 524, 336 A.2d 901, 903-04 (1975) (rehabilitation center for the physically handicapped
found to be a sanitarium; development center for retarded persons found to be an educational
use).
197. Id. The court explained its distinction as follows:
Clearly, the emphasis of the proposed rehabilitation center lies not with training, an im-
provement in the normal human condition, but rather with treatment, a restoration to a
normal human condition. . . . The evidence presented to the Board defined the purpose
of this Center as the training of retarded youths to assume a positive role in society, by
providing them with certain industrial skills. While such skills may appear simplistic to a
"normal" person, their assimilation nonetheless represents a great improvement in the
normal human condition of the trainees. The nature of the Child Development Center is
no less educational than that of the most demanding university.
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Although the treatment/habilitation distinction was somewhat artifi-
cial, 198 the opinion does provide precedent favorable to the charac-
terization of group homes as educational uses. The training of a wide
range of skills would probably stand a group home in its best
stead, 199 but would not be a prerequisite to characterizing the group
home as an educational use.
200
The nonresidential nature of the school was also of importance to
the court in Gilden,201 but it is not critical to the designation of an
educational use. When a facility is residential, 20 2 the education
should be provided at the facility and not elsewhere for the use to be
characterized as educational.20 3 Because the current provision of
services in most community living arrangements includes day place-
ment outside the group home 20 4 this may present some difficulties in
making an educational use argument. However, as one court has in-
dicated, the in-house education provided need only be
minimal 205 -a standard which can easily be met by the fact that
self-care/independent living skills are taught in community living ar-
rangements.
206
While an educational use provides an alternative to the family-
equivalent analysis, it is not the preferable mode of securing the
entry of group homes into neighborhoods. It does, however, provide
an alternative which has been more fully considered and accepted by
Pennsylvania courts.
198. This distinction fails to take into account the fact that appropriate habilitation may allow
some retarded people to progress to the point where they are no longer considered retarded.
See generally Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1317-18
(E.D. Pa. 1977), affd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en
banc), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 79-1404).
199. See Annot., supra note 160, at 1091.
200. See Appeal of St. Sophia Religious Ass'n, 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 237, 240, 365 A.2d 1389,
1391 (1976); Burgoon v. Zoning Hearing Bd, 2 Pa. Commw. Ct. 238, 244-45, 277 A.2d 837, 841
(1971).
201. 406 Pa. at 490, 178 A.2d at 565.
202. It should be noted that an ordinance may specifically exclude residential schools for the
"deficient." See Devereaux Foundation, Inc., Zoning Case, 351 Pa. 478, 481-82, 41 A.2d 744,
745 (1945).
203. If the facility is comprised of more than one building, each building may be required to
provide educational services. See id. at 481-82, 41 A.2d at 745-46. Where the residents attended
area public schools, no educational use was found in a residential facility. See Pennsylvania
George Junior Republic v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 151, 153, 389 A.2d 261,
262 (1978). Cf. Appeal of Hart, 15 Cumb. L.J. 56 (C.P. Pa. 1964) (variance for orphanage and
home for handicapped children denied).
204. Generally residents leave the home for school or participation in a sheltered workshop
during the day. Telephone interview with Marilyn Mennis, Alliance of Specialized Mental
Health and Mental Retardation Agencies, Philadelphia, Pa. (Feb. 20, 1979).
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IV. AVOIDING THE ZONING LAWS: GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
A. Introduction
The police power to regulate land use so as to protect the public
health, safety, welfare, and morals is not inherently at odds with the
establishment of community-based habilitative services by the state
as parens patriae. We have observed, however, that the local gov-
ernments to whom the state has delegated the power to zone will
sometimes use this power to impede the establishment of CLA's by
governmental units charged with the state's parens patriae re-
sponsibilities. 20 7 Where, in a situation such as this, these powers are
brought into conflict by the agencies that exercise them, the concept
of governmental immunity may provide a solution.
Governmental immunity is sometimes invoked to exempt gov-
ernmental units or instrumentalities from the operation of local zon-
ing ordinances.208 The theories invoked by courts to resolve these
"jurisdictional" disputes vary. 209 In some cases, the resolution rests
upon a determination of which of the antagonistic units or instrumen-
talities occupies the superior position in the governmental hierar-
chy.210 Where this test is employed, the zoning laws will frequently
give way since they are delegated to relatively small, local gov-
ernmental units.
211
Other courts resolve the issue whether a governmental unit or
instrumentality is subject to the zoning ordinances of a municipality
by determining whether the instrumentality seeking the immunity is
acting in a "governmental" or a "proprietary" capacity.212  A gov-
ernmental unit is deemed to be engaged in a governmental function,
and hence to be immune from zoning ordinances, when "it is acting
pursuant to and in furtherance of obligations imposed by legislative
mandate." 213  The activity is proprietary if the governmental unit
carrying it out has the power, but not the duty, to perform a specific
207. See notes 106-09 and accompanying text supra.
208. See, e.g., Township of South Fayette v. Commonwealth, 477 Pa. 574, 385 A.2d 344
(1978); City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174, 360 A.2d 607 (1976). See generally
Annot., 84 A.L.R. 3d 1187 (1978); Note, 84 HARV. L. REv. 869 (1971).
209. For very good summaries of these approaches, see Note, supra note 208; City of
Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174, 178-79 n.4, 360 A.2d 607, 609-10 n.4 (1976). The
Harvard commentator suggests that the theories are merely "distracting surrogates for reasoned
adjudication." Note, supra, at 869.
210. See, e.g., Metropolitan Dade County v. Parkway Towers Condominium Ass'n, 281 So.
2d 68 (Fla. App. 1973); Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575, 292 S.W.2d 777 (1956).
211. See notes 80-95 and accompanying text supra.
212. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court, 90 Ariz. 393, 368 P.2d 637 (1962);
Pruett v. Dayton, 39 Del. Ch. 537, 168 A.2d 543 (1961).
213. Note, supra note 208, at 870 (footnote omitted).
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function. 214 The test is not uniformly applied because jurisdictions
which follow this rule differ on the characterization of specific func-
tions.215
Finally, some courts use the eminent domain power as their
yardstick.2 16  Positing that the power of eminent domain is inhe-
rently superior to the exercise of the zoning power, these jurisdic-
tions hold that "the mere grant of eminent domain to a governmental
unit automatically renders the unit immune from zoning regula-
tions." 
2 17
B. Pennsylvania Law: The "Competing Legislative Grants" Test
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the
hierarchy theory, recognizing that "the municipalities exercising such
state powers [as zoning] are 'equally agents of the state.' "218 More-
over, the governmental-proprietary distinction has been specifically
disapproved for determining governmental tort liability 219 and has
been implicitly rejected as the sole determiner of immunity from zon-
ing ordinances. 22 0  In Pennsylvania, the grant of eminent domain
power is, however, considered persuasive and may, in fact, be dis-
positive. 221 The Pennsylvania test is developed in two cases: City of




215. Id. Compare County of Westchester v. Village of Mamaroneck, 22 App. Div. 2d 143,
255 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1964), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 940, 212 N.E.2d 442, 264 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1965)
(sewage disposal is a governmental function) with Jefferson County v. City of Birmingham, 256
Ala. 436, 55 So. 2d 196 (1951) (sewage disposal is a proprietary function for zoning purposes).
216. See, e.g., Mayor of Savannah v. Collins, 211 Ga. 191, 84 S.E.2d 454 (1954) (grant of
eminent domain power conclusive); State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960)
(same); cf. City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174, 184-85, 360 A.2d 607, 613 (pos-
session of eminent domain power would tip balance in favor of entity seeking to avoid zoning
ordinances; evidences legislative intent to preempt zoning laws).
217. Note, supra note 208, at 874. See City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174,
178-79 n.4, 360 A.2d 607, 609-10 n.4 (1976).
218. City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174, 182, 360 A.2d 607, 610 (1976), quot-
ing Note, supra note 208, at 877. Adopting this position makes possible a corollary argument
that if a municipality has not subjected itself to its own zoning ordinances, then other equal
bodies are also exempt. See Lauderdale County Bd. of Educ. v. Alexander, 269 Ala. 79, 86, 110
So. 2d 911, 917-18 (1959); Lees v. Sampson Land Co., 372 Pa. 126, 130-31, 92 A.2d 692, 695
(1952). See also Comment, The Inapplicability of Municipal Zoning Ordinances to Governmen-
tal Land Uses, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 698, 707 (1968).
219. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 597-98, 305 A.2d 877, 883-84 (1973).
220. See City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174, 178-79 n.4, 181-82, 360 A.2d
607, 609-10 n.4, 611-12 (1976).
221. See id. at 184-85, 360 A.2d at 613 (grant of eminent domain power evidences intent to
override municipal zoning powers). But see id. at 191, 360 A.2d at 616 (Eagen, J., dissenting)
("the presence or absence of eminent domain power is not a valid consideration").
222. 468 Pa. 174, 360 A.2d 607 (1976).
223. 477 Pa. 574, 385 A.2d 344 (1978).
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In City of Pittsburgh, the Bureau of Corrections (Bureau) sought
to establish a prerelease center for women convicts.2 24  The city
sought an injunction against the operation of the center.225 In a four
to three decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a de-
termination by the Commonwealth Court2 2 6 that the Commonwealth
was immune from zoning restrictions.2 2 7 The court held that
whether the Bureau was subject to local zoning ordinances was a
question of statutory interpretation 2 2 8 and that the act authorizing the
Bureau to establish the center did not indicate, either by express
language or implicitly by granting the Bureau the power of eminent
domain, legislative intent to override municipal zoning powers.
229
The court enunciated three factors to be considered in determin-
ing the legislative intent: 1) the nature of the competing legislative
grants; 2) the purposes for which they were given; and 3) the cir-
cumstances of the individual case. 23 0  In examining the legislative
grants, the court found that although the Bureau was given the power
to establish the prerelease centers "at such locations throughout the
Commonwealth" as it deemed necessary, 23l that did not amount to a
grant of eminent domain power.23 2 In addition, the court found no
legislative history otherwise indicating an intent to overcome the
applicable zoning enabling act which states that, in the event of a
conflict, it is to take priority if it imposes a higher standard. 233 Fi-
nally, the court emphasized the existence, in this particular case, of
alternatives that would accommodate the needs of the Bureau as well
as the community.
23 4
The dissent agreed that an analysis of the competing statutory
grants was the appropriate way to resolve this conflict, but strongly
protested the majority's narrow reading of the Bureau's mandate to
establish centers "at such locations throughout the Commonwealth as
the Bureau deems necessary."235 In the dissent's view this language
224. 468 Pa. at 177, 360 A.2d at 609.
225. Id.
226. City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 226, 341 A.2d 228 (1974),
rev'd, 468 Pa. 174, 360 A.2d 607 (1976).
227. 468 Pa. at 186, 360 A.2d at 613. See Note, 15 DUQ. L. REv. 721, 722 (1977).
228. 468 Pa. at 182, 360 A.2d at 611.
229. Id. at 184-85, 360 A.2d at 613.
230. Id. at 182, 360 A.2d at 611-12.
231. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 1051 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
232. 468 Pa. at 183-84, 360 A.2d at 612-13.
233. See 468 Pa. at 185-86, 360 A.2d at 613. For the text of the zoning enabling act, see PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 25051-25058 (Purdon 1957 & Supp. 1979). For the text of the conflicts
clause, see id. § 25058 (Purdon 1957).
234. 468 Pa. at 187, 360 A.2d at 614.
235. 468 Pa. at 188, 360 A.2d at 614-15 (Eagen, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied by the
dissent).
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was intended to preempt local zoning ordinances.2 36  The dissent
criticized the majority for placing the decision of where to locate such
facilities with the local zoning authorities who have no expertise in
determining locations which are consistent with the rehabilitative
process.23 7  The dissent's interpretation, on the other hand, would
put that responsibility in the hands of an authority with the requisite
expertise-i.e., the Bureau.2 38  Thus, the dissent maintained that
the legislative intent must have been to give the Bureau the power to
override local zoning ordinances.
23 9
In South Fayette, the Commonwealth Court granted a pre-
liminary injunction which the township had sought in order to enjoin
the Department of Public Welfare from operating an intensive treat-
ment center for juvenile delinquents.2 40 On appeal, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court began its analysis by observing that "[i]n order
to sustain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff's right to relief must
be clear, the need for relief must be immediate, and the injury must
be irreparable if the injunction is not granted." 241 The court then
reversed the grant of the injunction both because the plaintiff's right
to relief was uncertain and because immediate, irreparable injury had
not been shown. 242 Applying the three-pronged test announced in
City of Pittsburgh, the court stated that unlike that case, in this in-
stance, it was not at all clear that the state instrumentality was sub-
ject to the local zoning ordinance. 243 Two significant differences be-
tween South Fayette and City of Pittsburgh presumably account for
this conclusion.
In City of Pittsburgh, the parens patriae responsibility of the
state was not an element. Although the Bureau of Corrections in that
case was acting at the direction of the legislature, it was not carrying
out a parens patriae obligation.2 44 On the other hand, the activity of
the Department of Public Welfare in South Fayette, the care of dis-
turbed juveniles, is a parens patriae activity.2 45 The court's opinion
236. Id., 360 A.2d at 615 (Eagen, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 190, 360 A.2d at 615 (Eagen, J., dissenting).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 189-90, 360 A.2d at 615 (Eagen, J., dissenting).
240. 477 Pa. at 578, 385 A.2d at 345.
241. Id. at 580, 385 A.2d at 347 (emphasis supplied by the court).
242. Id. at 584-85, 385 A.2d at 349-50.
243. Id. at 580-81, 385 A.2d at 347-48.
244. 468 Pa. at 183-84, 360 A.2d at 612.
245. 477 Pa. at 581, 385 A.2d at 348.
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in South Fayette emphasizes the state's obligation to establish
adequate facilities for juveniles.
2 46
Secondly, the cases involved two entirely different zoning ena-
bling acts. The City of Pittsburgh case was decided Linder the zoning
enabling act for second-class cities, 2 47 while the South Fayette case
was decided under the Municipalities Planning Code.2 48  The
second-class cities' enabling act, as well as the act which applies to
first-class cities, contains specific conflict of law provisions. 2 49 The
MPC, by contrast does not contain any conflicts language.250 The
South Fayette court gave this as one of the reasons for its finding that
the township had not established a right to relief with the requisite
certainty for a preliminary injunction. 2 51 Thus, in South Fayette, the
presence of parens patriae considerations, and the lack of a specific
conflicts provision in the applicable zoning enabling act, tipped the
balance of competing legislative grants in favor of the state instrumen-
tality seeking immunity.
C. The Pennsylvania "Competing Legislative Grants" Test and
Community Living Arrangements
The Pennsylvania test, then, requires a court to balance the
legislative grant of the zoning power against the grant of power to the
governmental unit or instrumentality seeking immunity. It requires
that this balance take into account 1) the nature of the competing
grants; 2) their purpose; and 3) the circumstances of the case.2 52
Applying the approach of City of Pittsburgh and South Fayette to
the establishment of CLA's, it appears that a government instrumen-
246. Id. In addition to the parens patriae element, the South Fayette court mentioned that
Commonwealth ownership of the regulated land might be significant. Id. It is difficult to discern
why the court thought this should make a difference in balancing the competing interests. As
one commentator stated: "In as much as it is the use by the state of property in the perfor-
mance of its governmental function which generally runs afoul of zoning restrictions, it would
seem there should be no distinction between such use on state owned property or on property
leased to the state." Miller, Zoning and the State's Primary Police Power to Use Its Property in
Performing Governmental Functions, 3 So. U.L. REv. 133, 142 (1977) (emphasis in the origi-
nal). The court, itself, noted in the City of Pittsburgh case that "[t]he lessee of property is
bound by zoning ordinances in the same manner as the lessor is; zoning ordinances enacted
pursuant to a state statute are aimed at the use of property." 468 Pa. at 186 n.10, 360 A.2d at
613 n.10. Accordingly, it is hoped that courts applying the analysis of South Fayette will not
over-emphasize the significance of what was surely no more than a suggested consideration. The
South Fayette court never returned to the point. See 477 Pa. at 581-85, 385 A.2d 348-50.
247. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 25051-25058 (Purdon 1957 & Supp. 1979).
248. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10101-11202 (Purdon 1972 & Supp. 1979).
249. 477 Pa. at 582, 385 A.2d at 348. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 14762 (Purdon 1957 &
Supp. 1979) (first class cities); id. § 25058 (second class cities).
250. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11202 (Purdon 1972 & Supp. 1979).
251. 477 Pa. at 582, 385 A.2d at 348.
252. Id. at 580-81, 385 A.2d at 347-48; 468 Pa. at 182, 360 A.2d at 612.
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tality, such as the Department of Public Welfare, or a governmental
unit, such as a county, will be able to circumvent local zoning ordi-
nances enacted pursuant to the Municipalities Planning Code.
To begin, consider the treatment of the eminent domain power
in the balancing of the legislated grants. In City of Pittsburgh, the
court clearly indicated that if, in examining the competing grants, it
found that the unit or instrumentality trying to avoid the zoning ordi-
nance had been given the power of eminent domain by the legisla-
ture, the court would have to conclude that the zoning laws were
preempted. 253 Although the ability to exercise the power of eminent
domain is not given to the state Department of Public Welfare, such
power does rest with the counties 254 which are also under an obliga-
tion to ensure the availability of group homes. 255  Counties could use
this power to establish group homes and thus be able to circumvent
local zoning restrictions, although the likelihood of adverse political
reaction may deter them from doing so. 2 5 6  Nonetheless, based on
City of Pittsburgh, proponents of CLA's may argue that the very fact
that the counties-one of the governmental units responsible for ha-
bilitation 257-possess the eminent domain power 258 indicates that
the legislature intended the delivery of habilitative services to be free
of local zoning restrictions.
Another factor which may lead a court to conclude that CLA's
are exempt from local zoning ordinances is the fact that, like the
juvenile centers in South Fayette, CLA's involve an exercise of the
parens patriae obligation. 259 In discussing the nature of the state's
parens patriae obligation to juveniles, the court in South Fayette in-
dicated its awareness of the preference for a normalized atmosphere
for these facilities. 260  It would seem, therefore, that the parens pat-
253. 468 Pa. at 184-85, 360 A.2d at 613.
254. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2305 (Purdon Supp. 1979). County institution districts,
which are governmental units having the duty of providing for persons in institutions, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 62, § 2301(e) (Purdon 1968), are given the power of eminent domain as well. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2255(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979). See also Institution Dist. v. Township of
Middletown, 450 Pa. 282, 288-89, 299 A.2d 599, 602-03 (1973) (a county institution district
seeking to establish a facility is not subject to local interference through zoning regulations). It
appears that the City of Pittsburgh decision did not adversely affect this holding. See R. RYAN,
PENNSYLVANIA ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.3.14 (1977).
255. See notes 61-65 & 76-78 and accompanying text supra. See also Halderman v. Pennhurst
State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part, revd and remanded in
part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Mar. 25,
1980) (No. 79-1404).
256. See notes 87-92 and accompanying text supra.
257. See notes 54-78 & 89-95 and accompanying text supra.
258. See note 254 and accompanying text supra.
259. See notes 40-51 & 244-46 and accompanying text supra.
260. See 477 Pa. at 581-82 n.7, 385 A.2d at 348 n.7.
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riae obligation would be certain of receiving the same emphasis in a
CIA case as it received in South Fayette.
Finally, South Fayette's emphasis on the lack of a conflicts provi-
sion in the MPC, and the court's subsequent holding against the zon-
ing authority, 26' are promising signs for proponents of CLA's who
encounter opposition through ordinances enacted pursuant to the
MPC. While the absence of such a provision in the MPC is not de-
terminative of the entire immunity question, the omission substan-
tially reduced the chances of a summary disposition.2 62 Further,
when the lack of a conflicts clause in the MPC is combined with the
fact that CLA's are parens patriae facilities, it is clear that CLA's
present the same two crucial facts that accounted for the different
results between City of Pittsburgh and South Fayette.
263
Where placement of the CLA is sought and opposed in an area
subject to either the first or the second class cities zoning enabling
act, 26 4 as was the case in City of Pittsburgh, the situation is less
hopeful. The outcome of a balancing of competing grants will depend
upon whether there is language in the Department of Public Wel-
fare's mandate sufficient to offset the conflicts language in the zoning
law.2 6 5 As it now stands, the legislative mandate to the Department
under the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 is quite
similar to the language under which the Bureau of Corrections oper-
ated in City of Pittsburgh.26 6 It would seem that a more strongly
worded legislative mandate to the Department is required if it is to
overcome the zoning ordinances enacted by first and second class
cities.
V. RELIEF BY LEGISLATION
The entire morass of litigation might be completely avoided sim-
ply by the passage of a statute clarifying the nature of group homes
and the legislative intent regarding their location. Several states have
261. See notes 247-51 and accompanying text supra.
262. See 477 Pa. at 581-85, 385 A.2d at 348-50.
263. See notes 240-51 and accompanying text supra.
264. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 14751-14762 (Purdon 1957 & Supp. 1979) (first class cities);
id. §§ 25051-25058 (second class cities).
265. See note 252 and accompanying text supra.
266. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 1051 (Purdon Supp. 1979) and text accompanying note
231 supra (Bureau of Correction) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4202(b) (Purdon 1969) (De-
partment of Public Welfare). The 1966 Act describes the Department's authority as follows:
"The department is hereby authorized to establish, extend, operate, and maintain additional
facilities and provide mental health and mental retardation services therein. The department
may also lease or otherwise acquire, through the Department of Property and Supplies, other
additional facilities." Id.
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adopted such legislation, 267 and the American Bar Association Com-
mission on the Mentally Disabled has proposed a model statute 268
(Model Statute) dealing with these issues. Proposed statutes are pres-
ently before the Pennsylvania legislature. House Bills 2111,269
2112,270 and 2113,271 as well as Senate Bill 182,272 all provide that
community facilities housing from three to eight developmentally dis-
abled persons 273 (along with one or two other persons) shall be des-
ignated a residential use in all zones, including single-family residen-
tial zones. 274 There is a similar provision in the Model Statute,
275
but that act would also impose quality regulations as well as a zoning
exemption.
276
The bills presently before the House and Senate perform two
functions beyond simply defining group homes as residential uses. In
267. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5115-5116 (West 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. §§
27-10.5-133 (Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 252.28, 462.357 (West Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 30:4c-2(m) to 26.0 (West 1979); VA. CODE § 15.1-486.2 (Michie Supp. 1979). A chart of
recent statutes broken down into categories according to such factors as residents, types of
community facilities, and other pertinent items may be found in 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.
at 800-02 (1978).
268. ABA MODEL STATUTE, AN ACT TO ESTABLISH THE RIGHT TO LOCATE COMMUNITY
HOMES FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS IN THE RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOODS
OF THIS STATE, reprinted in Developmental Disabilities, supra note 27, at 806 [hereinafter
cited as ABA MODEL STATUTE]. For the complete text of the Act, see Appendix A infra.
269. H. 2111, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. For the complete text of H. 2111, see Appendix B
infra.
270. H. 2112, Pa. House, 1979 Sess.
271. H. 2113, Pa. House, 1979 Sess.
272. S. 182, Pa. Senate, 1979 Sess. For the complete text of S. 182, see Appendix C infra.
273. S. 182, Pa. Senate, 1979 Sess. § 1; H. 2111, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 2; H. 2112, Pa.
House, 1979 Sess. § 1; H. 2113, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 2. These bills also cover the mentally
ill, the physically handicapped, the elderly, and dependent children. S. 182, Pa. Senate, 1979
Sess. § 1; H. 2111, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 2; H. 2112, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 1; H. 2113,
Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 2.
274. S. 182, Pa. Senate, 1979 Sess. § 2; H. 2111, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 4; H. 2112, Pa.
House, 1979 Sess. § 4; H. 2113, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 4. Unfortunately, the House bills
contain some disturbing definitional language relating to the mentally ill. Two restrictions on
eligibility for mentally ill persons are included in the bills. First, all mentally ill persons who
are to be placed in community residential facilities must be certified by the county mental
health and mental retardation authorities as being capable of residing in a group home and
receiving services at a local community mental health center. H. 2111, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. §
2; H. 2112, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 1; H. 2113, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 2. Second, no one
undergoing involuntary treatment or subject to criminal charges is to be eligible for placement
in a community residential facility. H. 2111, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 2; H. 2112, Pa. House,
1979 Sess. § 1; H. 2113, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 2. These provisions are a patent denial of the
right of the mentally ill to treatment in the least restrictive alternative and to have a judicial
determination of the least restrictive alternative. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7106, 7107 (Purdon
Supp. 1979). See Eubanks v. Clark, 434 F. Supp. 1022, 1027-28 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See also
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd
in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48
U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1980) (No. 79-140).
275. ABA MODEL STATUTE, infra Appendix A, § 4.
276. Id. § 5.
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addition, these bills provide the mechanisms for registration 277 and
dispersal.2 78  Both are necessary for the success of the
deinstitutionalization/anti-institutionalization movement as an exercise
of the state's parens patriae obligation. 279 On their face, the bills
appear to be an honest attempt to alleviate some of the difficulties of
the group home movement, while truly promoting the primary objec-
tive of normalization. Parts of these bills appear to promote all of the
requisites for normalization -i.e., integration, dispersal, specializa-
tion, and continuity. 280 Unfortunately, several other sections of the
bills will enable the community prejudices against the mentally dis-
abled 281 to interfere with these good intentions.
Under the Senate and House Bills, dispersal of group homes is
mandatory. 282 A community living arrangement may not be estab-
lished within 2,000 feet of another facility or within 1,000 feet of a
drug and alcohol treatment center.2 83  In light of the possibilities of
impacted areas of group homes emerging, this provision would seem
to be not only desirable, but essential to ensure normalization. The
bills also provide for the granting of exceptions to this location re-
quirement. 28 4 The defect in the proposed legislation is that the
granting of exceptions is left to the unbridled discretion of the local
authorities; 285 this may allow for ghettoization or exclusion. 286 The
Model Statute, on the other hand, incorporates dispersal within the
overall licensing process and requires consideration of population,
need, and the provision of other services.2 87 This would seem to be
a better way of ensuring the provision of appropriate services to men-
tally retarded persons. Certainly there must be some consideration of
needs which exceed the area encompassed by the municipality. To
avoid the possibility of exclusionary zoning or the denial of services,
277. See note 288 infra.
278. See notes 6 & 38 and accompanying text supra.
279. The need for dispersal depends in part on the size of the home. If there are fewer than
four persons, dispersal is not as necessary since the size approximates that of a normal family.
See Zoning for Community Residences, supra note 7, at 319.
280. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
281. See notes 25-26 & 106-09 and accompanying text supra.
282. S. 182, Pa. Senate, 1979 Sess. § 3; H. 2111, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 5; H. 2112, Pa.
House, 1979 Sess. § 4; H. 2113, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 5.
283. S. 182, Pa. Senate, 1979 Sess. § 3; H. 2111, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 5; H. 2112, Pa.
House, 1979 Sess. § 4; H. 2113, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 5.
284. S. 182, Pa. Senate, 1979 Sess. § 3; H. 2111, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 5; H. 2112, Pa.
House, 1979 Sess. § 4; H. 2113; Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 5.
285. S. 182, Pa. Senate, 1979 Sess. § 3; H. 2111, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 5; H. 2112, Pa.
House, 1979 Sess. § 4; H. 2113, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 5.
286. See notes 32-36 and accompanying text supra.
287. See ABA MODEL STATUTE, infra Appendix A, § 5(a).
[VOL. 25: p. 273
38
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss2/3
ZONING FOR RETARDED CITIZENS
municipalities should be required to promulgate ordinances which set
concrete standards for determining the exception. Such standards
should take into account the quality of services to retarded persons.
Other provisions of the Pennsylvania bills attempt to inhibit
ghettoization by permitting the political subdivision to limit those
served by the community's group homes to residents of that commu-
nity.288 If, however, a group home cannot be filled by appropriate
residents of the community, the state or county agency in charge of
placement may locate other residents of the county in the home.
2 9
If a retarded individual cannot be served within his or her commu-
nity, the state or county may place the person in the nearest facility
with available space. 290 The Model Statute, on the other hand,
leaves the responsibility for continuity and specialization to the reg-
ulatory powers of the state director.
291
Regulating the quality of care in community living arrangements,
as provided in the Model Statute, 292 is still a necessity in Pennsyl-
vania, 293 but appears to be outside the scope of tie proposed
Pennsylvania bills. With the innumerable questions surrounding the
status of group homes at the present time, the clarification which
might be available from these proposed acts would certainly be a wel-
come relief,294 although certain revisions may be necessary. Inhibit-
ing the ghettoization of group homes by limiting them to community
residents must be balanced against other fundamental rights held by
retarded individuals. The right to travel is abridged if a retarded per-
son, wishing to relocate, is confined to the area in which he or she is
found to be a resident by virue of his or her inability to receive resi-
288. S. 182, Pa. Senate, 1979 Sess. § 4; H. 2111, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 7, H. 2112, Pa.
House, 1979 Sess. § 4; H. § 2113, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 7. The registration provisions of
the bills have the potential to perform many useful functions. Each political subdivision is re-
quired to keep records available on the location and capacity of each group home within its
boundaries. S. 182, Pa. Senate, 1979 Sess. § 4; H. 2111, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 6; H. 2112,
Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 4; H. 2113, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 6. The Model Statute has similar
registration requirements. See ABA MODEL STATUTE, infra Appendix A, § 5(4).
289. S. 182 Pa. Senate, 1979 Sess. § 4; H. 2111, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 7; H. 2112, Pa.
House, 1979 Sess. § 4; H. 2113, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 7.
290. S. 182, Pa. Senate, 1979 Sess. § 4; H. 2111, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 7; H. 2112, Pa.
House, 1979 Sess. § 4; H. 2113, Pa. House, 1979 Sess. § 7.
291. ABA MODEL STATUTE, infra Appendix A, § 5(l)(b).
292. See Developmental Disabilities, supra note 27, at 804-05.
293. See generally Zoning for Community Residences, supra note 7, at 319.
294. Senate Bill 182 and its companion bills in the House mark the third attempt to pass leg-
islation of this kind since the fall of 1976. The Senate Bill was introduced as S. 1442 in 1976 and
died on the floor of the legislature. It was reintroduced in 1977 and passed, but on the same
day, a vote on reconsideration was taken, thereby revoking the earlier passage. Letter from
Thomas F. Halloran, Esq., Pennsylvania Department of Justice Community Advocacy Unit, to
Penelope A. Boyd (April 18, 1979). The past failures of the bill have been attributed to two
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dential services in another community. This confinement certainly




The mentally retarded have faced years of prejudice as a result of
their handicap. Often, their greatest problem is not the handicap it-
self, but rather the reactions of those around them. Such reactions
have caused the retarded to be hidden away in institutions and sub-
jected to many personal and physical indignities. The growing aware-
ness of the normalization potential and the concurrent elimination of
exclusive dependence upon the institution have created a new set of
community and zoning conflicts. On the horizon, after the resolution
of the zoning question, the applicability and enforceability of restric-
tive covenants must be addressed. 296 The advent of the belief that
the retarded can grow has been a great step toward the return of the
retarded to their communities and society. It would be disastrous to
allow the irrational fears of others to deny the retarded and non-
retarded members of society the benefits of the experiences which
they might both share.
295. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 261-62 (1974) (invalidating
one-year residence requirement in county as prerequisite to indigent's receipt of medical ser-
vices at county's expense because such a requirement penalizes indigents for exercising their
constitutional right to migrate). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-33 (1969)
(invalidating one-year residency requirement as prerequisite to receipt of welfare benefits be-
cause such a requirement infringes upon right of interstate movement); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 338-39 (1972) (durational residency requirement for voter registration directly im-
pinges on the exercise of the fundamental right to travel). Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
406-09 (1975) (residency requirement for nonessential services not unconstitutional).
296. See generally Seaton v. Clifford, 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1972);
Brownfield v. Ohio, No. 77-12-2995 (C.P. Summit County, June 12, 1978). The Model Statute
would eliminate this problem as well as the zoning problem. See ABA MODEL STATUTE, infra
Appendix A, § 6.
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APPENDIX A
ABA MODEL STATUTE, AN ACT TO ESTABLISH THE RIGHT TO LOCATE COMMUN-
ITY HOMES FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS IN THE RESIDENTIAL
NEIGHBORHOODS OF THIS STATE*
Section 1. Title
This act shall be known as the "Location Act for Community Homes for Developmentally
Disabled Persons."
Section 2. Statement of Purpose
The general assembly declares that it is the goal of this act to improve the quality of life of
all developmentally disabled persons and to integrate developmentally disabled persons into the
mainstream of society by ensuring them the availability of community residential opportunities
in the residential areas of this state. In order to implement this goal, this act should be liberally
construed toward that end.
Section 3. Definitions
As used in this act:
(1) "Developmental Disability" means a disability of a person which:
(a)(i) is attributable to mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or autism;
(ii) is attributable to any other condition found to be closely related to mental retardation
because such condition results in similar impairment of general intellectual functioning or adap-
tive behavior to that of mentally retarded persons or requires treatment and services similar to
those required for such persons; or
(iii) is attributable to dyslexia resulting from a disability described in clause (i) or (ii) of this
paragraph; and
(b) has continued or can be expected to continue indefinitely.
(2) "Developmentally Disabled Person" means a person with a developmental disability.
(3) "Director" means the director of developmental disabilities (or appropriate state official).
(4) "Family Home" means a community-based residential home licensed by the director
that provides room and board, personal care, rehabilitation services, and supervision in a family
environment for not more than [six (6)] developmentally disabled persons.
(5) "Permitted Use" means a use by right which is authorized in all residential zoning
districts.
(6) "Political Subdivision" means a municipal corporation, township, or county.
Section 4. Permitted Use for Family Homes
A family home is a residential use of property for the purposes of zoning and shall be
treated as a permitted use in all residential zones or districts, including all single-family residen-
tial zones or districts, of all political subdivisions. No political subdivision may require that a
family home, its owner, or operator obtain a conditional use permit, special use permit, special
exception, or variance.
Section 5. Licensing Regulations and Density Control for Family Homes
(1) For the purposes of safeguarding the health and safety of developmentally disabled
persons and avoiding over-concentration of family homes, either along or in conjunction with
similar community-based residences, the director or the director's designee shall inspect and
license the operation of family homes and may renew and revoke such licenses. A license is
valid for one year from the director may inspect such homes more frequently, if needed. The
director shall not issue or renew and may revoke the license of a family home not operating in
compliance with this section and regulations adopted hereunder. Within one hundred eighty
(180) days of the enactment of this act, the director shall promulgate regulations which shall
encompass the following matters:
(a) Limits on the number of new family homes to be permitted on blocks, block faces, and
other appropriate geographic areas taking into account the existing residential population den-
sity and the number, occupancy, and location of similar community residential facilities serving
*Comments, alternatives, and footnotes omitted.
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persons in drug, alcohol, juvenile, child, parole, and other programs of treatment, care, super-
vision, or rehabilitation in a community setting;
(b) Assurance that adequate arrangements are made for the residents of family homes to
receive such care and rehabilitation as is necessary and appropriate to their needs and to further
their progress towards independent living;
(c) Protection of the health and safety of the residents of family homes, provided that com-
pliance with these regulations shall not relieve the owner or operator of any family home of the
obligation to comply with the requirements or standards of a political subdivision pertaining to
building, housing, health, fire, safety, and motor vehicle parking space that generally apply to
single family residences in the zoning district; and provided further that no requirements for
business licenses, gross receipt taxes, environmental impact studies or clearances may be im-
posed on such homes if such fees, taxes, or clearances are not imposed on all structures in the
zoning district housing a like number of persons;
(d) Procedures by which any resident of a residential zoning district or the governing body
of a political subdivision in which a family home is, or is to be, located may petition the director
to deny an application for a license to operate a family home on the grounds that the operation
of such a home would be in violation of the limits established under paragraph (1)(a) of this
section;
(2) all applicants for a license to operate a famly home shall apply to the director for the
license and shall file a copy of the application with the governing body of the political subdivi-
sion having jurisdiction over the zoning of the land on which the family home is to be located.
All applications must include population and occupancy statistics reflecting compliance with the
limits established pursuant to paragraph (1)(a) of this section.
(3) The Director may not issue a license for a family home until the applicant has submit-
ted proof of filing with the governing body of the political subdivision having jurisdiction over
the zoning of the land on which such a home is to be located, a copy of the application at least
thirty (30) days prior to the granting of such a license, and any amendment of the application
increasing the number of residents to be served at least fifteen (15) days prior to the granting of
a license.
(4) In order to facilitate the implementation of paragraph (1)(a), the director shall maintain
a list of the location, capacity, and current occupancy of all family homes. The director shall
ensure that this list shall not contain the names or other identifiable information about any
residents of such homes and that copies of this list shall be available to any resident of this state
and any state agency or political subdivision upon request.
Section 6. Exclusion by Private Agreement Void
Any restriction, reservation, condition, exception, or covenant in any subdivision plan,
deed, or other instrument of or pertaining to the transfer, sale, lease, or use of property which
would permit residential use of property but prohibit the use of such property as a family home
for developmentally disabled persons shall, to the extent of such prohibition, be void as against
the public policy of this state and shall be given no legal or equitable force or effect.
Section 7. Severability of Sections
If any section, subsection, paragraph, sentence, or any other part of this act is adjudged
unconstitutional or invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remainder of
this act, but shall be confined to the section, subsection, paragraph, sentence, or any other part
of this act directly involved in the controversy in which said judgment has been rendered.
APPENDIX B
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1979 SESSION, HOUSE BILL 2111
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LOCATION AND OPERATION OF COMMUNITY
RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES.
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby enacts as follows:
Section 1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Community Residential Facility Siting
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Section 2. Community residential facility defined.
For the purposes of this act, "community residential facility" means a facility providing
residence and specialized services for a minimum of three but no more than eight developmen-
tally disabled, mentally retarded, mentally ill, physically handicapped, elderly persons or de-
pendent children referred by the appropriate county or State agency responsible for placement
and qualified staff who provide 24-hour care, supervision and services for such residents and not
more than two of whom shall be residents of the facility. In order to qualify for assignment to a
community residential facility, mentally ill persons shall be certified by county mental health
and mental retardation authorities as capable of residing in a group home and receiving services
from a local community mental health program. No person receiving treatment under Article III
(Involuntary Examination and Treatment) or Article IV (Determinations Affecting Those
Charged with Crime, or Under Sentence) of the act of July 9, 1976 (P.L.817, No. 143), known as
the "Mental Health Procedures Act" shall be eligible for such facility.
Section 3. Applicability and construction of act.
(a) The provisions of this act shall be applicable in every municipality throughout the
Commonwealth, including those operating under home rule charters and optional plans of gov-
ernment.
(b) The provisions of this act shall be applicable to all community residential facilities estab-
lished subsequent to the effective date of this act, notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of
any other act or ordinance. Nothing in this act shall effect the status of community residential or
similar facilities established prior to the effective date of this act except that those community
residential facilities established prior to the effective date of this act shall register with the
appropriate municipality. This act shall not be construed to limit or restrict the authority or
appropriate State agencies to approve or license community residential facilities.
Section 4. Status for zoning purposes.
A community residential facility shall be considered a residential use of property permitted
in all residential zones. All comprehensive zoning plans shall be construed to permit the loca-
tion of community residential facilities in all residential zones.
Section 5. Restrictions on locations.
No community residential facility shall be established within 2,000 feet of any other such
facility nor shall it be established within 1,000 feet of any drug and alcohol center. Agents of a
facility may apply for an exception to those requirements and such exceptions may be granted at
the discretion of the zoning hearing board of the municipality.
Section 6. Municipal records.
Each municipality shall maintain appropriate records indicating the location, capacity and
agent of each community residential facility within its jurisdiction and such information shall be
available to the public. Each community residential facility shall register its location, capacity
and agent with the appropriate officials of the municipality. The agent shall be responsible for
maintaining the facility to ensure that it is similar in appearance and condition to other private
residences in the community.
Section 7. Residents of community residential facilities.
A municipality may require that all residents of the community residential facility shall be
residents of the municipality in which the facility is located or a contiguous municipality. In the
event there are not enough appropriate residents of that municipality or contiguous
municipalities to maintain full occupancy of the community residential facility then the appro-
priate county or State agency responsible for placement shall notify the municipality and that
community residential facility shall be available for new placements from other residents of the
county in which the facility is located. However, if it is certified by the appropriate county or
State agency responsible for placement either that there is no space available in an appropriate
community residential facility, or that there is no appropriate community residential facility
available, then with the approval of that agency an occupant may reside in the nearest appro-
priate community residential facility with space available.
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Section 8. Effective date.
This act shall take effect in 90 days.
APPENDIX C
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1979 SESSION, SENATE BILL 182
AN ACT PROVIDING THAT A COMMUNITY RESIDENTIAL FACILITY SERVING NO
LESS THAN THREE OR MORE THAN EIGHT MENTALLY RETARDED, PHYSICALLY
HANDICAPPED, OR ELDERLY PERSONS, OR DEPENDENT CHILDREN BE CONSI-
DERED A RESIDENTIAL USE OF PROPERTY AND PERMITTED IN ALL RESIDEN-
TIAL ZONES OF ALL CITIES, COUNTIES AND OTHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby enacts as follows:
Section 1. (a) A community residential facility means a facility providing residence for a
minimum of three but no more than eight elderly, physically handicapped, mentally ill or de-
velopmentally disabled persons or dependent children and providing residence for one or two
other persons who provide services for such residents.
Section 2. A community residential facility shall be considered a residential use of property
in all residential zones, including but not limited to residential zones for single family dwellings
within all cities, counties and other political subdivisions.
Section 3. No community residential facility as defined in section 1, shall be established
within 2,000 feet of any other facility nor shall it be established within 1,000 feet of any drug
and alcohol center. Agents of a facility may apply for an exception to those requirements and
such exceptions may be granted at the discretion of the local political subdivision.
Section 4. Each political subdivision shall mention appropriate records indicating the loca-
tion and number of residents served by each community residential facility within its jurisdic-
tion; such information shall be available to the public. Each community residential facility shall
register its location, capacity and agent with the appropriate officials of the political subdivision.
The agent shall be responsible for maintaining the facility to ensure that it is similar in appear-
ance and condition to other homes in the community. A political subdivision may require that
all the occupants of the community residential facility shall be residents of the municipality in
which the facility is located. In the event there are not enough appropriate residents of that
municipality to maintain full occupancy of the community residential facility then the appro-
priate county or State agency responsible for placement shall notify the political subdivision and
that community residential facility shall be available for new placements from other residents of
the county in which the facility is located. Notwithstanding, if it is certified by the appropriate
county or State agency responsible for placement either that there is no space available in an
appropriate community residential facility, or that there is no appropriate community residential
facility available, then with the approval of that agency an occupant may reside in the nearest
appropriate community residential facility with space available.
Section 5. Nothing in this act shall effect the status of community residential or similar
facilities established prior to the effective date of this act; however, those community residential
facilities established prior to the effective date of this act shall register with the appropriate
political subdivision.
Section 6. This act shall not limit or restrict the authority of appropriate State agencies to
approve or license community residential facilities.
Section 7. This act shall take effect immediately.
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